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THE SHORTCOMINGS OF INDETERMINACY IN
ARMS CONTROL REGIMES:
THE CASE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
ByJack M. Beard*
I. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, INDETERMINACY, AND DESIGN ELEMENTS FOR
ARMS CONTROL REGIMES
In 1972 a historic attempt to create the world's first international legal regime banning the devel-
opment and possession of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) culminated in
the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).' Crippled by key compromises
made by the great powers in pursuit of various self-interested security objectives in the context of
the Cold War, the Convention is fundamentally flawed. Although the BWC purports to outlaw the
development and possession of all biological weapons, deadlier and more sophisticated biological
weapons than were imaginable in 1972 can now be and have been produced, as evidenced in Octo-
ber 2001 by two letters sent to the Capitol Hill offices of Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy.2
These letters reportedly contained threatening notes and a dangerous and sophisticated form of
"weapons-grade" anthrax spores.3 Even though both the sender of these letters and the source of the
anthrax remain unknown, the technical sophistication of the spores led some experts to suggest that
the attacker was supported by a U.S. "biodefense" laboratory or an advanced foreign-state-run bio-
logical weapons (BW) facility because the spores could not have been produced by an amateur
working in his basement.
4
* Professorial Lecturer, University of California at Los Angeles; former Associate Deputy General Counsel (Inter-
national Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not
reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. The author appreciatively acknowledges
useful comments by David Koplow, Maximo Langer, and Kal Raustiala on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Scott
Dewey and Emmy Levens for research assistance.
' Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, 1015 UNTS 163 [here-
inafter BWC].
2 A study by the Central Intelligence Agency reports that advances in science and technology since 1972 have
resulted in genetically engineered pathogens with the ability to cause effects "worse than any disease known to man."
John Mintz & Jody Warrick, U.S. Unprepared Despite Progress, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at Al.
3 A diverse group of sixteen biodefense scientists published a paper describing the Senate anthrax powder as an
exceptionally deadly "weapons-grade" version of the bacterium with "high spore concentration, uniform particle
size, low electrostatic charge, treated to reduce clumping." Thomas V. I nglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon,
2002: Updated Recommendations for Management, 287J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2236,2237 (2002); see also Dan Eggen
& Guy Gugliotta, FBI Secretly Trying to Re-create Anthraxfrom MailAttacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2002, at A9
(describing the particles as "astonishingly pure"); Gary Matsumoto, Anthrax Powder: State oftheArt? 302 SCIENCE
1492, 1492-94 (2003); Reynolds M. Salerno et al., A BW Risk Assessment: Historical and Technical Perspectives,
NONPROLIFERATION REV., Fall/Winter 2004, at 25, 53 n.50.
4 Although the FBI originally suggested that the anthrax powder could have been produced by a lone amateur
working in a basement laboratory, this theory soon came to be regarded as unlikely and was abandoned. Guy
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 271 (2007).
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In addition to the empirical evidence of new "super" biological weapons, the failings of the
BWC are further manifested by the growing significance that countries like the United States
attach to the BW threat,5 allegations by senior U.S. government officials that terrorists and
rogue states possess biological weapons,6 and contentious review conferences of BWC states
parties that have been unable to resolve cheating and compliance concerns. Furthermore, a sig-
nificant number of states have not yet joined the BWC and few have joined in recent years,
prompting statements of concern about its lack of universality.7
The BWC is commonly said to have failed because it lacks mandatory transparency mea-
sures and a dedicated monitoring organization.8 This explanation, which is well grounded in
arms control practice, international relations theory, and theoretic game models, posits that a
state actor is unlikely to forgo a particular class of weapons permanently unless it receives assur-
ances that adversary states are reciprocally so committed and an effective monitoring regime
is in place to ensure against a "surprise defection," that is, cheating.9 Perceived security threats
and asymmetrical information may generate or enlarge incentives for states to renege, making
the Pareto-optimal outcome of mutual disarmament decidedly unstable and transparency a
critical factor in ensuring that one state does not take advantage of the other."l In spite of this
recognized need for transparency, the states parties to the BWC have been unable to agree on
any mandatory transparency measures and the United States in particular has blocked serious
efforts at reform. 1 While the lack of transparency is thus widely cited as a reason for the BWC's
Gugliotta & Gary Matsumoto, FBIs Theory on Anthrax Is Doubted; Attacks Not Likely Work of] Person, Experts
Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2002, at Al. The spores were also reportedly identified as belonging to a highly
virulent strain of anthrax used in U.S. biodefense research programs. Eileen Choffnes, Bioweapons: New Labs,
More Terror? BULL. ATOM. SCI., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 28. After more than five years without an arrest, however,
some FBI officials have reportedly questioned the sophistication of the anthrax powder used in the attacks.
Allan Lengel & Joby Warrick, FBI Is Casting a Wider Net in Anthrax Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2006,
at Al.
5 Four of the top five "Nightmares for Disaster Planning" developed by the Department of Homeland Security
involve BW attacks. Eric Lipton, U.S. Lists Possible TerrorAttacks and Likely Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at
Al. The perceived BW threat also figured prominently-and erroneously-in the arguments of senior U.S. officials
justifying an invasion of Iraq. Eg, Steven R. Weisman, Powell, in UN. Speech, Presents Case to Show Iraq Has Not
Disarmed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at Al.
6 President Bush has flatly stated that "[riogue states and terrorists possess these weapons and are willing to use
them." George W. Bush, Statement on Strengthening the International Regime Against Biological Weapons, 37
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1580, 1580 (Nov. 5, 2001).
7 The Secretary-General: Message to the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons
Convention (Nov. 19, 2001), available at <http://www.opbw.org> [hereinafter BWC Web site].
8 The lack of verification mechanisms has been criticized and debated by BWC states parties since at least 1986,
resulting in intensive, but unsuccessful, efforts by the "Ad Hoc Group" from 1994 to 2001 to develop a protocol
to the BWC that would have established various legally binding declaration, visit, and continuous monitoring pro-
cedures. See infra notes 77-84 and corresponding text.
9 Looking at the role that information can play in strategic interactions between states acting with mixed motives,
legal scholars have used the well-known Prisoners' Dilemma and other models drawn from noncooperative game
theory to gain valuable insights into the meaning and function of arms control agreements generally. See, e.g., Ken-
neth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify" The Production ofInformation in Arms Control Treaties and Other International
Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
10 ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 142 (1990). Transparency is also linked to rationalist explanations of state compliance with interna-
tional law that rely on reputational concerns. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Reg-
ulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 402 (2000).
" The U.S. government abruptly ended a seven-year-long reform in July 2001 by effectively ending consider-
ation of the BWC draft protocol. See infra notes 80- 84 and corresponding text.
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lack of success, this article argues that another, equally important factor contributes to the inef-
fectiveness of the BWC and other disarmament or arms control regimes that operate in envi-
ronments where member states perceive their security to be threatened: the use of indetermi-
nate'2 language in key provisions, a phenomenon that is sometimes characterized as a
dimension of "soft law."
There is substantial disagreement among legal scholars about the definition, status, and
role of soft law; 3 however, many argue that it considerably influences the behavior of states
and displays significant advantages over "hard law" in different areas of international prac-
tice.1" The term "soft law" is often used to denote principles, standards, or arrangements
of a nonlegally binding nature. 15 But the absence of formal legal obligation is arguably only
one characteristic of a continuum of softness: the term "soft law" is also used by scholars
to refer to hortatory language' 6 and to imprecise, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise inde-
terminate formulations, 17 even when found in legally binding agreements like the BWC. 8
Key structural deficiencies in international agreements, such as the failure of the BWC to
provide for any mandatory mechanisms to enhance transparency and enforcement, are
also sometimes associated with soft law when the elements of an international agreement
" I use the term "determinacy" to encompass concepts of both precision and clarity and I refer to determinate
provisions as those that clearly convey their message, communicate their intent, and help "shape that intent into
a specific situational command." Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AJIL 705, 725
(1988).
13 Commentators have long suggested that "soft law" can manifest itself in an "infinite variety" of forms. See
R. R. Baxter, InternationalLaw in Her "Infinite Variety," 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 549 (1980). Sufficient variations
of soft law now exist for scholars to suggest that there is "no acepted definition." Dinah L. Shelton, Normative Hier-
archy in International Law, 100 AJIL 291, 319 (2006).
14 SeeAndrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory ofInternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1880 (2002)
("[M]any instruments that are not considered 'law' under the classical definition have a substantial impact on the
behavior of states."); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AJIL 259, 269
(1992) (describing soft law solutions as "useful steps on a longer journey" and the point where "international law
and international politics combine to build new norms"); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law andlnter-
national Relations Theory: A New Generation oflnterdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AJIL 367 (1998) (emphasizing the
advantages of nonbinding soft law in the context of international governance and the generation of norms by supra-
national institutions and their dissemination by nongovernmental organizations); David Weissbrodt & Muria
Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AJIL 901, 914 (2003) (noting the impact of soft law on the interpretation of treaties and on the
establishment of customary international law in areas such as human rights).
15 Shelton, supra note 13, at 319.
" Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NON-BINDING ACCORDS 1, 3
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE].
1 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG.
421, 422 (2000) (arguing that "'soft law' begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation"); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International
Law? 77 AJIL 413, 414-15 n.7 (1983) (stating that "[i] t would seem better to reserve the term 'soft law' for rules
that are imprecise and not really compelling"); Shelton, supra note 13, at 319 (noting that "[t] he term 'soft law' is
also sometimes employed to refer to the weak, vague, or poorly drafted content of a binding instrument"). Unlike
hortatory or purely aspirational language, however, such indeterminate provisions retain a legally binding character
and are not soft law in the sense that an adjudicative body with jurisdiction would decline to apply them on the
grounds that they do not entail a legal obligation whose content can be ascertained by resort to established inter-
pretive techniques.
IS FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS 200-01 (1989); Christine Chinkin, Norma-
tive Developments in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-
BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21,25-26 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE].
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are viewed as a whole. 9 While these different variants of soft law are often merged to such
an extent that some scholars appear to find little reason to distinguish between them,2°
others argue that such a merger impedes the study of law's relative influence on state behav-
ior because it conflates the legally binding nature of agreements with other issues such as
their substance or structure. 2 However it is characterized, the fusion of a "hard," legally
binding agreement with "soft," indeterminate language is a common, yet problematic,
trade-off22 that merits separate analysis, particularly in the context of arms control
regimes that attempt to regulate potentially destabilizing technology with both peaceful
civilian uses and devastating military applications. 23 This article thus focuses on indeter-
minate language in legally binding agreements, which represents one choice that states
may make from a range of options for designing arms control and disarmament regimes.
One approach to resolving indeterminate legal terms involves delegating authority to judi-
cial bodies to interpret ambiguous language. Since some degree of rule indeterminacy is com-
mon in the domestic context, judges in domestic courts are often called upon to apply and
interpret broad standards or to engage in the case-by-case administration ofjustice.2" Similarly,
some international adjudicative bodies may also apply broad standards that require consider-
able interpretation and filling in of gaps.2 ' The resolution by third-party adjudication, how-
ever, of issues arising from indeterminate language in the arms control context generally rep-
resents an unacceptable threat to the sovereignty and national security of states, particularly the
most powerful ones. State actors operating in an anarchic and unforgiving security environ-
ment pursue policies with respect to international cooperation on the basis of their own self-
interested motives or preferences, 26 and so approach disarmament regimes and other restric-
tions in the "high politics" arena of war and peace with great suspicion. While states may
conclude that their interests are advanced by joining security regimes, the terms of governing
international agreements are invariably subject to scrutiny and compromise. In this regard,
states-especially the most powerful states, which are accustomed to setting the rules of most
19 See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99 AJIL 581, 582 (2005) (suggesting that
legality, substance, and structure can be viewed as "distinct design elements" that should be treated holistically in
evaluating the effectiveness of international agreements).
20 Atsuko Kanehara, Some Considerations Regarding Methods of International Regulation in Global Issues: Sover-
eignty and 'Common Interests, 'in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 16, at 81, 83.
21 Raustiala, supra note 19, at 582, 589-90.
22 Whatever term is used to describe the result, if a broad conceptual framework is applied to the architecture of
international agreements, placing indeterminate provisions in a legally binding agreement may be characterized as
one of several possible "systematic trade-offs" between form and substance that states make in designing their inter-
national commitments. Id. at 581.
23 The security dilemmas that states routinely face in arms control regimes are likely to be significantly more pro-
nounced or acute when such complex dual-use technology is regulated. See infra note 91 and corresponding text.
24 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An EconomicAnalysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Prob-
lems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianjudicialArtist: Statutes andthe New
LegalProcess, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983).
25 The WTO Appellate Body, for example, applies and interprets some indeterminate language in the context
of economic regulation. Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333,
337-38 (1999). Similarly, "friendship, commerce and navigation" treaties contain standards that are sometimes
interpreted by the International Court ofJustice. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A BriefHistory ofInternationallnvest-
mentAgreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 164-65 (2005).
26 Underlying state motivations may be described as "preferences" as to goals or outcomes as opposed to strategies
or ways to reach goals. Robert Powell, Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,
48 INT'L ORG. 330 (1994).
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international regimes according to their interests27-are generally unwilling and unlikely to
entrust their most important security interests to other states or to adjudication by interna-
tional institutions.28
In view of the high stakes associated with international security cooperation, it is useful to
assess the design of arms control regimes in the context of preferences that may underlie self-
interested state behavior. This article undertakes such an assessment and uses the BWC to
explore the choices states make along a continuum of options that include various dimensions
of soft and hard law. In doing so, it illuminates the hazards of choosing indeterminate language
to perform critical regime functions amid unstable security conditions.
Many scholars proclaim the virtues of soft law, including that dimension characterized by
indeterminacy of language. In the area of arms control, some suggest that different types of soft
law may at least be no less effective than hard law, especially when widely supported norms are
involved,2 9 or that they may in fact offer distinct advantages over hard law.30 While indeter-
minate language may serve as a useful tool for states in certain negotiations and agreements,
this article shows that it is fatal to the success of arms control in general, and multilateral dis-
armament agreements in particular. Even with all the transparency measures imaginable
(including intrusive monitoring and verification mechanisms), indeterminacy of the language
delineating permissible behavior will doom arms control to failure. Such indeterminacy not
only robs commitments of credibility-making it impossible to solve the security dilemma-
but also is likely to exacerbate the security dilemma, breeding more of the mistrust that feeds
it. By cloaking defection in plausible legality, many acts of noncompliance may be legitimized.
Moreover, indeterminacy permits discriminatory application of key rules, favoring powerful
states and deterring weaker states from joining the regime. This set of problems is illustrated
below by consideration of the indeterminate language that has helped undermine the BWC
and may have worsened the BW arms race.
Part II of this article briefly reviews the development of international legal prohibitions
related to biological weapons and examines the origins and nature of the indeterminate BWC
legal framework. Using the BWC to illustrate the process whereby states make various sub-
stantive and structural trade-offs in designing international regimes, it analyzes the compro-
mises that led to the adoption of this framework. Part II concludes by summarizing the regime's
27 See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTER-
NATIONAL REGIMES 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); see also Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and
National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336 (1991).
28 Bilateral arms control treaties help illustrate how states generally prefer recourse to unilateral measures or bilat-
eral dispute resolution procedures rather than entrusting third parties with the power to interpret terms that relate
to national security in such agreements. See, e.g., Note, Legal Models ofArms Control Past, Present, and Future, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1326 (1987) (noting that the ABM, SALT I, and SALT II treaties all established a Standing Con-
sultative Commission (SCC) to interpret ambiguous phrases but that the USSR and the United States never invited
other parties to participate in SCC proceedings); Angela M. Bradley, Opposing Interpretations ofan International
Treaty: The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty Controversy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 295, 296 (2001).
29 See, e.g., Richard L. Williamson Jr., Is International Law Relevant to Arms Control? Hard Law, Soft Law, and
Non-law in MutilateralArms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59, 63 n.14 (2003) (further
arguing that "[1] ittle in arms control seems to depend on whether one thinks of this category as a subset of soft law
or just very mushy hard law").
31 See Barry Kellman, Protection of Nuclear Materials, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 18, at
486, 494 -95 (arguing that soft law makes a better framework than hard law for the regulation of nuclear materials
protection); Abram Chayes & Dinah Shelton, MultilateralArms Control: Commentary, in id at 521, 526 ("Soft law
can make an important contribution because it can more quickly respond to changing weapons technologies that
create uncertainty about the risks of the future strategic situation and the mechanisms to minimize them.").
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problematic and indeterminate provisions and provides an overview of the unsuccessful per-
formance of the BWC to date.
Parts III, IV, and V analyze the combined effects on arms control regimes of indeterminacy
and lack of transparency in the context of three groups of states, as defined by their preferences:
defensive defectors, offensive defectors, and compliant or conformist states. This examination
demonstrates how psychological and rational mechanisms associated with indeterminate lan-
guage can enlarge existing security dilemmas, undermine cooperation, and impede the uni-
versality of arms control regimes. The analysis of the negative effects of indeterminacy on arms
control regimes in the context of these three preference groups is then applied to the particular
case of the BWC regime. Taking into account the possibilities for improved performance sug-
gested by the assessment of indeterminate arms control regimes in highly insecure environ-
ments, parts III, IV, and V evaluate, within the three respective preference groups, the role that
determinate provisions could play together with transparency in addressing the observed defi-
ciencies of the BWC regime. The United States recently abandoned its support for BWC
reform efforts that were consistent with such an approach and instead placed itself as the main
obstacle to these widely accepted reform measures, expressing unilateralist sentiments and
broad national security concerns that also reflected the opposition of the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry to such measures.
Part VI concludes by briefly contrasting the experience of the BWC with that of other mul-
tilateral disarmament regimes to illustrate how states are increasingly using determinacy to reg-
ulate complex dual-use technology problems (that is, technology that can be used either for
building prohibited weapons or for legitimate, peaceful purposes) related to WMDs, and it fur-
ther considers the complementary role that determinacy must play in successful BW nonpro-
liferation efforts generally.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE INDETERMINATE AND INEFFECTIVE BWC REGIME
The First Prohibition Against the Use ofBiological Weapons
Although its use in warfare has been relatively rare, disease is said to have been employed as
a weapon as early as the Middle Ages.3 1 Practical considerations, however, greatly limited the
use of biological agents as weapons, particularly as they were difficult to produce, store, and
deploy, and were as likely to harm friendly forces as the enemy. Nascent efforts by states to
regulate the increasingly destructive new weapons near the end of the nineteenth century
included agreements banning the use of certain poisons and asphyxiating gases but not bio-
logical weapons. 32 In spite of early efforts to ban asphyxiating gases, chemical weapons (CW)
were used extensively in World War I and caused hundreds of thousands of casualties. After
31 There are various primitive examples of biological warfare. See ROBIN CLARKE, THE SILENT WEAPONS 14
(1968); GEORGE DEAUX, THE BLACK DEATH: 1347, at 1444 (1969); Jeffery K. Smart, History of Chemical and
Biological Warfare: An American Perspective, in 16 TEXTBOOK OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 9, 12 (Frederick R. Sidell et al. eds., 1997).
32 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans
247 (prohibited, inter alia, the use of poison or poisoned arms); Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July
29, 1899, TEXTS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCES AT THE HAGUE, 1899 AND 1907, at 81 (James Brown Scott
ed., 1908), 1907 Gr. Brit. TS No. 32 (Cd. 3751) (banned "the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the dif-
fusion of asphyxiating gases"); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (included a declaration outlawing the use of asphyxiating gases).
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the war, widely publicized accounts of the suffering and death associated with CW led to var-
ious attempts by states formally and effectively to outlaw the use of all chemical weapons.
At a multilateral arms control conference in 1925 addressing the nonuse of poisonous gases,
a prohibition on "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare" was proposed for the first
time." The work of this conference resulted in the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of Poisonous Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare on June 17, 1925
(Geneva Protocol), which banned the use of both chemical and biological weapons.34 How-
ever, banning biological weapons, in contrast to chemical weapons, was a new legal concept in
1925. Since any practical threat presented by these weapons in 1925 was merely imagined, the
authors of the Geneva Protocol in effect sought to ban a weapon of thefuture. 35 In doing so,
states demonstrated the power of biological weapons to cause considerable fear and insecurity
on a largely abstract level.
As an international agreement, the Geneva Protocol was significantly limited in the scope
of its application. The text banned the use, in war, 36 of biological weapons only against other
states parties (not states generally),37 and did not ban the possession or development of these
weapons. Many states also made reservations declaring that the obligations under the Protocol
would cease to be binding on them if enemy states failed to respect its prohibitions, effectively
making it a prohibition on the "first use" of chemical and biological weapons. 38 Thus, the Pro-
tocol's de facto recognition of a potential defensive or deterrent basis for these weapons- cou-
pled with the absence of any prohibition on their development, acquisition, possession, man-
ufacture, or transfer-resulted in a legal framework that allowed states to conduct BW
research, develop new biological weapons, and ultimately engage in BW arms races.
33 1st and 2nd meetings of the General Committee of the Conference for the Supervision of the International
Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, League of Nations Doc. A. 13.1925.IX. Although the
term "bacteriological" has a narrower scientific definition than "biological," in legal contexts the two terms have
been used interchangeably in disarmament negotiations since before World War II. See A. BOSERUP, CBW AND
THE LAW OF WAR 43 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], The Problem of Chemical and
Biological Warfare Vol. 3, 1973). The broad, modern international legal definition of biological weapons encom-
passes several known categories of pathogens and toxins and also includes those that may come from as yet undis-
covered sources, "regardless of any technical developments." See GA Res. 2603A (MV) (Dec. 16, 1969); see also
infra note 39. The broad scope of this general prohibition has been repeatedly reaffirmed by states at BWC review
conferences.
31 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteri-
ological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 UST 571, 94 LNTS 65.
35 As a forward-looking ban, the prohibition on the use of biological weapons envisioned by the Geneva Protocol
was comprehensive in spirit. See BOSERUP, supra note 33, at 40-41. The all-inclusive scope of the prohibition was
reinforced by the term methods of warfare, potentially extending its coverage to a wide variety of means, processes,
designs, delivery systems, and types of targets. Id. at 71.
36 By agreeing to prohibit the use of biological weapons only"in war," the parties to the Geneva Protocol left open
the possibility of using biological weapons in noninternational armed conflicts, or in other contexts not amounting
to "war." See id. at 28-33.
37 Although the prohibition against the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases was viewed by some as a
reaffirmation of an existing norm, the prohibition against biological weapons was an innovation that had not yet
attained that status, leaving the parties bound in this area only "as between themselves according to the terms of this
declaration." Id. at 21-23.
38 See, for example, the reservations of France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, Geneva Protocol
Reservations, SIPRI, High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Protocol (2005), available at <http://www.sipri.org/
contents/cbwarfare/cbwresearchdoc/cbw historical/cbwhistorical.html>. Although forty-two states origi-
nally made reservations to the Protocol, many would later withdraw them upon becoming a party to the BWC.
20071
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The BWArms Race
The fears generated by biological weapons and the security dilemmas that states have faced
in arming against BW threats have historically been compounded by fundamental identifica-
tion problems associated with the development of these weapons. Since disease occurs natu-
rally, a troubling question of intention has often arisen when the scientific or military estab-
lishments in adversary states have been reported to be in possession of components or
technology with BW applications. 39 It was in fact the fear of nonexistent weapons, the potential
impact of technological advances, and the misperception of threats that first inspired several
states to begin to develop their own BW programs shortly after the legal ban on their use was
formalized in 1925.40 In a remarkable testament to the power of these concerns, "mispercep-
tions of enemy interest" appear to have compelled several states to begin building biological
weapons soon after the Geneva Protocol was signed.4 1
Events in World War II further demonstrated the power of BW misperceptions to magnify
security dilemmas and motivate states to pursue BW programs. Although after the war the lack
of any large-scale German BW program was established, both Britain and the United States
had misperceived a serious German BW threat during the war and responded by developing
their own BW programs.4 2 Both countries also concluded that the best defensive arsenal should
include offensive biological weapons and in 1942 Britain conducted tests that for the first time
proved the effectiveness of bombs with BW agents.4 3
American efforts at the close of World War II to limit access to captured scientists respon-
sible for Japan's infamous BW experiments on humans increased Soviet suspicions of U.S.
intentions regarding new BW capabilities and set the stage for the Cold War BW arms race.4 4
While the United States had not shown great interest in BW research programs in the 1930s,
efforts to build a BW program expanded rapidly at the end of World War II and funding was
dramatically increased. 45 After adopting a policy in 1956 to be "prepared to use chemical and
39The regulation of biological weapons has always been complicated by the requirement of intention, while no
such requirement is stated for chemical weapons. See INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 258 (2d ed. 2000).
Thus, the UN General Assembly has defined prohibited biological agents of warfare as "living organisms, whatever
their nature, or infective material derived from them-which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals
or plants." GA Res. 2603A (XXIV), supra note 33 (emphasis added).
"0 J. PERRY ROBINSON & M. LEITENBERG, THE RISE OF CB WEAPONS 332 (SIPRI, The Problem ofChemical
and Biological Warfare Vol. 1, 1971) (arguing that during the interwar years groups of individuals in the most pow-
erful states decided that potential enemy countries were interested in biological warfare when in fact it appears that
in most countries other than Japan biological weapons were "at most the part-time concern of very small groups
of people").
41 Id. at 332-33.
42 
SHELDON H. HARRIS, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 1932-45 AND THE
AMERICAN COVER-UP 161 (1995); seealso BartonJ. Bernstein, Churchill' SecretBiological Weapons, BULL. ATOM.
SC., Jan./Feb. 1987, at 46, 47-49.
4' Early U.S. BW planners concluded that "the best defense is offense and the threat of offense." U.S. National
Academies, War Bureau ofConsultants, Final Report (1942), quotedin ED REGIS, THE BIOLOGYOF DOOM: THE
HISTORY OF AMERICA'S SECRET GERM WARFARE PROJECT 177 (1999). Britain conducted tests in which
25-pound anthrax bombs were dropped among tethered sheep on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland. TOM
MANGOLD & JEFF GOLDBERG, PLAGUE WARS 30 (2001); Bernstein, supra note 42.
44 DANIEL BARENBLATT, A PLAGUE UPON HUMANITY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AXIS JAPAN'S GERM
WARFARE OPERATION 207-09 (2004); MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 43, at 27-28, 44; REGIS, supra
note 43, at 107-11.
"5 Bernstein, supra note 42, at 49; Henry L. Stimson Center, History of the U.S. Offensive Biological Warfare
Program (1941-1973), available at <http://www.stimson.org/cbwl?sn=CB2001121275>.
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bacteriological weapons in general war," 46 the United States embarked on extensive programs
to test the lethality, survivability, and dispersal characteristics of biological agents.
Choosing Indeterminacy and No Transparency: The Creation ofthe BWC
At the height of the massive BW arms race in the midst of the Cold War, President Rich-
ard M. Nixon took the dramatic and unexpected step on November 25, 1969, of unilat-
erally renouncing the possession and use by the United States of "lethal biological agents
and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare," and declaring that all biological
research in the future would be confined to "defensive measures such as immunization and
safety measures. "4 Although the stated goal was to advance world peace, the questionable
military utility of biological weapons significantly influenced the opinions of U.S. decision
makers. In spite of newly developed practical applications, President Nixon and U.S. mil-
itary leaders had serious reservations about the effectiveness of biological weapons and
believed that nuclear forces provided both sufficient and superior strategic deterrence for
the United States.
48
As the United States proceeded to destroy its BW arsenal, the United Kingdom continued
its attempt to achieve a worldwide treaty banning biological weapons.4 9 In 1969 theBritishand
Americans were able to agree on the final wording of such a treaty, but the Soviet Union ada-
mantly opposed the effort even after the British removed language requiring enforceable ver-
ification measures.5" In August 1970, the Soviets suddenly dropped their objections to the pro-
posal, and within a year the Americans, the British, and the Soviets were able to report the draft
BWC to the United Nations for its approval.51 The BWC was opened for signature on April
10, 1972, and the United States became a party on January 22, 1975.52
Cold War scenarios, often modeled in game theory as iterated, two-person Prisoners'
Dilemmas, might suggest that the United States and its allies became a party to the BWC to
achieve what they hoped would be a Pareto-optimal disarmament arrangement with the Soviet
46 National Security Council, Reg. NSC 5062/1 (Mar. 15, 1956), quoted in REGIS, supra note 43, at 177. This
new policy appeared to be broad enough to envision the first use of biological weapons.
47 Richard M. Nixon, Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs, 1969 PUB. PAPERS
461, 461 (Nov. 25, 1969). The renunciation was later extended to cover the use and production of all biological
toxins as well. MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 43, at 56 n.22 (citing White House Press Release (Feb. 14,
1970)).
48 MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 43, at 55, 61. U.S. military officials believed that biological weap-
ons were not likely to be useful for either tactical applications or strategic deterrence. President Nixon is quoted
as telling his staff, "We'll never use the damn germs, so what good is biological warfare as a deterrent? If some-
body uses germs on us, we'll nuke 'em." William Safire, Essays; Iraq's Ton of Germs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995,
at A25.
'9 In August 1968, the United Kingdom proposed a convention banning biological weapons by submitting a
working paper to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Susan Wright, Evolution of Biological Warfare
Policy, 1945-1990, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE 26, 38 (Susan Wright ed., 1990).
50 MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 43, at 57.
5 On December 16, 1971, the General Assembly approved the treaty by a vote of 110-0. GA Res. 2826 (XXVI)
(Dec. 16, 1971).
52 Following the Senate's advice and consent, President Gerald Ford ratified the treaty for the United States and
also took the long-overdue action of ratifying the Geneva Protocol, doing so with no reservations regarding the use
of biological weapons.
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Union.5 3 Such paradigms do not, however, fully explain this Cold War transaction, particu-
larly since its impact on third parties significantly informed U.S. preferences.5 4 As a balance-
of-power issue, the spread of biological weapons was seen by American strategists as an unde-
sirable way for relatively weak countries to obtain great destructive capability, while at the same
time reducing the U.S. advantages in the acquisition and deployment of expensive conven-
tional and nuclear forces.55 Believing that most states were not yet in a position to develop
advanced biological weapons, the United States and Britain sought to negotiate the BWC with
the Soviet Union quickly, in part to lock in existing strategic advantages over less developed
states.
56
While the Soviets obtained their key objective by eliminating any mandatory transparency
measures in the BWC regime, the United States and Britain obtained what they thought was
a critical Soviet concession by signing a "hard" legally binding instrument. In hindsight, this
was a dubious achievement for the Western powers since a legally binding agreement gave the
Soviets a deceptive legal cover for a massive offensive BW program when an informal arrange-
ment might not have falsely raised such expectations of their compliance. From the outset,
Soviet acquiescence in a legally binding BWC appears to have been a cynical maneuver that
enabled the clandestine building of the largest BW research and armament program in histo-
ry.57 The Soviet Union was not, however, the only state to seek compromises that would ulti-
mately weaken the BWC.
In negotiating the design of agreements, states may face a wide range of trade-offs in
substance, structure, and obligation that include hard and soft levels of legalization, and
thus yield different types of commitments and different degrees of difficulty in achieving
these agreements. 51 Various forms of soft law are touted by scholars as an easier way for
states facing these choices to achieve desired objectives, to accommodate different interests
through short-term compromises, and to provide the flexibility to address uncertainties
and other issues. 59 In the case of the final compromise BWC text, the design elements cho-
sen by the drafting parties-hard legally binding obligations, soft structure (lacking any
5' Although there are at least seventy-eight different two-person, two-strategy games, game theorists and political
scientists have often focused on the Prisoners' Dilemma and its associated problems, even though it does not apply
to most conflicts. WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 129 (1992). The Prisoners' Dilemma in fact
became so commonly associated with nuclear arms rivalry that it was "oversold" as a paradigm for Cold War rela-
tions, sometimes overshadowing the realities of arms races. Id.
54 Many arms races are not true Prisoners' Dilemmas since relativistic assessments of mutual armament and dis-
armament may appear to provide higher returns to one of the parties, resulting in a zero-sum game in which the
equilibrium outcome is no longer Pareto-deficient. STEIN, supra note 10, at 126-27. While a disarmament agree-
ment is more likely to meet the requirements for a true Prisoners' Dilemma, the parties negotiating such agreements
may not be genuinely focused on reducing competition between themselves but may instead be more interested in
achieving relative advantages over third parties. Id. at 133.
55 See Letter from Matthew S. Meselson to Henry A. Kissinger, national security adviser (Sept. 1969), quoted in
JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AMERICA'S SECRET WAR 62 (2001); Susan
Wright, Introduction: In Search ofa New Paradigm ofBiological Disarmament, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DIS-
ARMAMENT: NEW PROBLEMS/NEW PERSPECTIVES 3, 7 (Susan Wright ed., 2002).
56 See Susan Wright, Geopolitical Origins, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 55, at
313, 323 (drawing largely on declassified UK government biological arms control studies).
"7 SeeAnthony Rimmington, The Soviet Union s Offensive Program: The Implicationsfor ContemporaryArms Con-
trol, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 55, at 103, 121.
58 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 436.
59 Id. at 423, 436 (noting how soft law can serve as a "compromise at a point in time" that can accommodate
"different interests and values, different time horizons and discount rates, and different degrees of power"); Raus-
tiala, supra note 19, at 586, 613; Weiss, supra note 16, at 6.
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access to transparency measures), and soft indeterminate language-reflected a complex
set of preferences. Both the United States and Britain, like the Soviet Union, were clearly
not eager to accept the sovereignty costs and security limitations associated with either pre-
cise requirements or intrusive inspections.
60
Ambiguity in the BWC advanced important security objectives for the United States
and Britain. The Western militaries in particular were unwilling to accept any clarifying
distinctions between "peaceful" and prohibited BW activities, which resulted in the inten-
tional placement by the Western powers of a fatal ambiguity at the heart of the BWC.6 '
While indeterminate provisions and a lack of transparency created a real possibility of
future undetected defections, the ultimate national security interests of the Western pow-
ers were thought to be safeguarded in 1972 by powerful strategic nuclear deterrents. In the
context of bipolar Cold War security and competition, the BWC drafting parties thus per-
ceived a rational basis for eschewing both precision in their commitments and serious
monitoring mechanisms, but this decision would have far-reaching consequences for the
BWC regime when it was forced to confront BW proliferation challenges beyond the
Cold War paradigm.
Overview ofthe Indeterminate Provisions in the B WC
The central obligation of the BWC is found in Article I, which requires each state party
never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain...
[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of produc-
tion. '"62 This comprehensive ban, however, is limited in the same sentence to apply only to
agents or toxins if they are "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes."63 The BWC offers no definitions of or clarifying rules
on the types of biological agents that have "no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes."' Similarly, both the obligation imposed upon states parties in Article II
to destroy or convert to peaceful purposes all prohibited agents, toxins, weapons, or equipment
in their possession and the prohibition in Article III preventing states parties from transferring
prohibited agents, toxins, weapons, or equipment are explicitly made dependent on what
might be included within the scope of the indeterminate phrase "peaceful purposes" found in
Article I.
To provide for domestic enforcement of its treaty obligations, each BWC state party is
required to take the necessary measures within its territory to prohibit and prevent the
60 For a review of formerly classified internal documents detailing the British government's deliberations on join-
ing the BWC and its assessment of the legal, political, and military implications of biological and chemical disar-
mament, see Wright, supra note 56, at 313-42. For a variety of reasons, including a desire to protect both com-
mercial and military secrets, the Western powers were also reluctant to accept highly intrusive verification measures.
Id. at 335.
61 Id. at 336; Jonathan B. Tucker, A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare,
1969-70, 27 INT'L SECURITY 107, 124 (2002) (discussing the desire of U.S. military planners to maintain a suf-
ficient BW program to "avoid technological surprise by an enemy").
62 BWC, supra note 1, Art. 1(1).
63 Id.
64 Weapons, equipment, or means of delivery of agents and toxins are also prohibited, provided that they are
"designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict." Id., Art. 1(2).
2007]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of unlawful agents, tox-
ins, weapons, and equipment." Once again, however, determining the extent of this
prohibition depends on the vagaries of the term "peaceful purposes" as set forth in Article
I. With respect to international enforcement, the BWC provides that a state party may
submit a complaint of noncompliance to the UN Security Council, but the Convention
does not specify any clear legal requirements or rules to invoke in lodging such a com-
plaint, which must establish a "breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the
Convention."
66
The lack of any determinate rules or criteria in the BWC also raises troubling issues with
respect to the obligation of states parties to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteri-
ological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. " 6 7 With no definition of
what constitutes "peaceful purposes," how can any state determine precisely what should
be exchanged to the fullest possible extent, on the one hand, and what should be restricted,
on the other, to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons? The lack of such a def-
inition similarly complicates the obligation to implement the BWC so as to avoid ham-
pering international cooperation and exchanges in "peaceful" biological activities.
6 8
Cheating Under the BWC, Insecurity, and the Failure ofReform Efforts
Less than a year after it signed the BWC, the Soviet Union embarked on a massive clan-
destine cheating effort in which it concealed a vast network of BW research, development,
testing, and production facilities within its existing civilian and military structures under
the direction of an organization known as Biopreparat. 69 Only after a major accident at
a military microbiology factory in Sverdlovsk in 1979 and the subsequent defection of key
scientists did the size and scope of the secret Soviet effort begin to become apparent.
7 °
By the time the second BWC review conference of the states parties met in September
1986,71 allegations of Soviet treaty violations, growing suspicions about the easily concealed
65 The BWC envisions that states parties will do much of the policing, requiring each one to take "any necessary
measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of
such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere." Id, Art IV.
66 Id., Art. VI(1). Without UN action, resolution of disputes between states parties is subject only to voluntary
consultation and cooperation under Article V.
67 Id, Art. X(l). In addition, the states parties are encouraged to cooperate in contributing to the "further devel-
opment and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or
for other peaceful purposes." Id.
68 Id, Art. X(2).
69 Rimmington, supra note 57, at 108-13; see also AMY E. SMITHSON, TOxiC ARCHIPELAGO: PREVENTING
PROLIFERATION FROM THE FORMER SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS COMPLEXES 10 (Henry
L. Stimson Center Report No. 32, Dec. 1999), available at <http://www.stimson.org/cbw/pdf/toxicarch.pdf>;
Jonathan B. Tucker et al., Biological Weapons Proliferation from Russia: How Great a Threat? in REPAIRING THE
REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 217, 217-19 (Joseph Cirincione
ed., 2000).
70 Michael Moodie, The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, NONPROLIF-
ERATION REV., Spring 2001, at 59, 60-61.
71 States parties held a review conference five years after the BWC's entry into force to assure its provisions were
being "realized." BWC, supra note 1, Art. XII. The first review conference was held in Genevaon March 3-21, 1980,
and subsequent review conferences have since been held every five years.
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nature of recent advances in biotechnology, and the absence of effective BWC verification
mechanisms led to the adoption of several voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs)
that called for the exchange of information about research centers and laboratories with high-
containment facilities and data on unusual outbreaks of disease. 72 Amid continuing allegations
of noncompliance, the third review conference in 1991 established a second set of CBMs, call-
ing on states to provide information voluntarily on past offensive BW programs, vaccine pro-
duction facilities, and relevant BW legislation, regulations, and other measures. 73 The "Ad
Hoc Group of Governmental Experts" (referred to as "VEREX") was also established to identify
and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint.7 4 The
need for such measures, as well as the shortcomings of the voluntary CBM process, was dra-
matically exposed a few months later, in early 1992, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin made
a series of startling admissions about Soviet violations of the BWC.7 5
By 1994 it was generally acknowledged that voluntary CBMs were a failure,76 prompting
a Special Conference of States Parties to establish the "Ad Hoc Group of States Parties" (Ad
Hoc Group) to negotiate a more effective and legally binding verification regime for the
BWC.7 7 The weakness of the existing BWC regime was made more apparent in the summer
of 1995 when Iraq acknowledged that it had maintained an offensive BW program from 1975
until January 1991, even though it had previously claimed that it did not possess any biological
weapons.78 Amid rising concerns about the BWC's ineffectiveness and Iraqi defiance of new
UN inspections, the fourth review conference met in late 1996 and discussed the work of the
Ad Hoc Group. After four and a half more years of negotiations, a "composite text" of a BWC
draft protocol containing compromise language for outstanding bracketed issues was submit-
ted by the chairman of the Ad Hoc Group and considered in April 2001 .79
72 Second Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, Final Document: Part II, Final Declaration, Doc.
BWC/CONF.11/13/II (1986), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7. These voluntary exchanges were con-
ducted as a "consultation" activity under Article V.
7" Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, Final Document: Part II, Final Declaration, Annex, Doc.
BWC/CONF.III/23 (Part II Annex) (1991), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7.
74 Id., Final Declaration, Doc. BWC/CONF.111/23 (Part II), Art. V. In September 1993, VEREX issued a report
concluding that a combination of twenty-one verification and assurance measures (including information moni-
toring, data exchange, remote sensing, inspections, and continuous monitoring) could help strengthen the BWC
through increased transparency. See Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential
Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint: Summary Report, Doc. BWC/CONF.III/
VEREX/8, at 7-8 (1993), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7.
75 Graham S. Pearson, The Essentials ofBiological ThreatAssessment, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 55, 75-78 (Ray-
mond A. Zilinskas ed., 2000).
76 SeeJonathan B. Tucker, The BWCNew Process: A PreliminaryAssessment, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Spring
2004, at 26, 28, available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol 1/ 111/111 tucker.pdf> (noting that since the first
CBMs were developed in 1986, "only a small minority of member states have submitted the CBM declarations on
a consistent basis").
77 For a review of the Ad Hoc Group's unsuccessful attempt to develop a BWC verification protocol and an exam-
ination of its different components, see JEz LITTLEWOOD, THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: A
FAILED REVOLUTION (2005).
78 Richard Butler, Inspecting Iraq, in REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 69, at 175, 175-78. Iraq signed the
BWC on May 11, 1972, and finally ratified it on June 19, 1991, after being directed to do so by the UN Security
Council. SC Res. 687, paras. 8-10 (Apr. 3, 1991).
79 Protocol to the BWC, Doc. BWC/AD HOC GROUP/CRP.8 (draft, Apr. 3, 2001), available at BWC Web
site, supra note 7. The proposed legally binding text included provisions requiring states to make declarations
regarding their biodefense programs and relevant facilities, to submit to routine site visits and challenge-type inves-
tigations of suspect facilities, and to permit investigations of suspicious outbreaks of infectious disease.
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On July 25, 2001, the U.S. ambassador to the twenty-fourth session of the Ad Hoc Group
stunned delegates by unexpectedly rejecting the composite text of the draft protocol, arguing
that it "would put national security and confidential business information at risk" and that it
would ",do little to deter those countries seeking to develop biological weapons." 8 0 Otherthan
noting general national security risks and the proprietary concerns of the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, the United States offered no specific reasons for its actions, leading domestic and
international observers to complain that the decision had been heavily influenced by the drug
companies.81 The U.S. criticism of the draft protocol's ineffectiveness was all the more unex-
pected in view of the many changes that had previously been made in the text based on Amer-
ican objections.82 When the fifth review conference convened on November 19, 2001, the
United States sought to terminate the Ad Hoc Group's discussion of legally binding multi-
lateral measures altogether. Rejecting the draft protocol as a "flawed text" that would neither
detect nor deter proliferators, the U.S. representative also named specific states that he said
were not complying with the BWC obligations.83 With the draft protocol effectively dead, the
fifth review conference was hastily adjourned and any further discussion of similar multilateral
initiatives was suspended.8 4
Unsuccessful BWC reform efforts thus have been accompanied by allegations of extensive
noncompliance, underscoring the regime's failings while exacerbating perceived threats that
can contribute to further defections. In the absence of both effective transparency measures and
determinate rules to define illicit activity, governments and nonproliferation experts remain in
substantial disagreement over which states to accuse of misconduct or to include on lists of
states possessing or pursuing BW programs. 85 Although the U.S. government has obvi-
ously not included itself on any list of states of BW concern, many nonproliferation experts
'0 Ambassador Donald Mahley, Statement to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Par-
ties (July 25, 2001), at <http://www.state.govlt/ac/rls/rm/2001/5497.htm>.
81 See, e.g., Editorial, Germ- WarfareAbdication, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2002, atA18 (arguing that both the
Clinton and Bush administrations "bought the dubious argument of representatives of the pharmaceutical industry
that an aggressive system of international inspections might result in the disclosure of trade secrets"); Rachel Giese,
Fear and Secrecy Along 49th Parallel, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 6, 2001, at A35.
82 Michael Crowley, Letter to the Editor, Iraq's Weapons, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 5, 2001, at 2 (senior
analyst, British American Security Information Council, noting that "the US consistently watered down sugges-
tions for intrusive investigations due to concerns over national security and the protection of its pharmaceutical
industry. It then rejected and effectively destroyed the whole protocol process on grounds that it would'not improve
our ability to verify compliance'.").
83 John R. Bolton, Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention RevCon Meeting (Nov. 19,2001), avail-
able at <http:llwww.state.gov/tlus/rmljanjuly/6231.htm>. The states that the United States accused of pursuing
prohibited BW programs were Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. The United States has continued
to make such allegations against several of these countries, most recently at the sixth review conference in 2006.
8
4 See Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, Final Document, Doc. BWC/CONF.V/17
(2002), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7. States parties have since been engaged in brief meetings designed
to "discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action" on voluntary measures. Id, para. 18(a). Del-
egates to the sixth review conference in 2006 continued to avoid discussing any initiatives similar to the draft pro-
tocol and agreed on little beyond the need for continuing to talk. See Peter Crail, The Sixth Review Conference of
the Biological Weapons Convention: Success or Failure? [interview of Jonathan B. Tucker] (Jan. 4, 2007), at
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070104.htm> (observing that the fact that the conference was hailed as a success
"suggests how dysfunctional the biological arms control process has become").
85 With a lack of determinate rules and no monitoring mechanisms to confirm suspicions, there is pre-
dictable disagreement among experts about which states are states of BW concern. Various research institutes
and nonproliferation experts list approximately a dozen states that, to varying degrees, could be considered
of BW concern, with a higher level of consensus on the following nine countries: China, Egypt, India, Iran,
Israel, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and, with growing reservations, Cuba. See JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL.,
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disagree and contend that the United States is itself contributing to an insecure BW envi-
ronment by conducting research in expansive "biodefense" programs that appears to vio-
late the BWC.8 6
III. INDETERMINATE ARMS CONTROL REGIMES AND DEFENSIVE DEFECTORS
Indeterminacy in Multilateral Disarmament Regimes andAcute Security Dilemmas
Security cooperation andstatepreferences. Given the dangers posed by surprise defections,
states might be expected to pursue arms control activities with their rivals by establishing
highly institutionalized hard law regimes that contain explicit definitions of cheating and
specify elaborate verification and monitoring procedures. 87 Contrary to these expecta-
tions, however, some scholars argue that states use a wide variety of forms of soft law in
the area of arms control8 8 and that soft law may serve just as well as hard law for various
types of arms control regimes or even offer distinct advantages.89 States may in fact be
tempted to choose different dimensions of soft law as design elements for multilateral dis-
armament regimes for many of the same reasons they choose them in other areas of coop-
eration, perceiving these soft options as an easier way to promote maximum participation
in such regimes while better addressing potential advances in technology or other uncer-
tainties.
Although multilateral disarmament and bilateral arms control regimes share many common
characteristics, the latter are usually associated with agreements between the United States and
the Soviet Union that were based on nuclear parity, benefited from a variety of bilateral dynam-
ics across many different fields of cooperation, and could rely on carefully scripted reciprocal
behavior between the two parties that is hard to replicate in complicated multilateral relation-
ships. Multilateral disarmament agreements present many similar security problems but must
address more complex compliance issues and involve more complicated game theory models. 9'
DEADLY ARSENALS: TRACKING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 68 (2d ed. 2005); Arms Control Asso-
ciation, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation at a Glance (2002), at <http://www.armscontrol.
org/factsheets/>; Federation of American Scientists, States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2000), at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd-state.htm>; Center for Non-
proliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present (2002),
at <http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/>; Henry L. Stimson Center, Biological Weapons Proliferation Con-
cerns (2007), at <http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=CB2001121274>.
86 See, e.g., Seth Brugger, Briefing Paper on the Status of Biological Weapons Nonproliferation (Arms Con-
trol Association, Sept. 2002, updated by Kerry Boyd, May 2003), available at <http://www.armscontrol.org/
pdf/bwissuebrief.pdf>; see also Milton Leitenberg et al., Biodefense Crossing the Line, 22 POL. & LIFE SCI. 1,
1-2 (2004).
17 See STEIN, supra note 10, at 97, 40; Guido den Dekker, The Effectiveness oflnternational Supervision in Arms
Control, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY 315 (2004).
88 See Chayes & Shelton, supra note 30, at 523-24 (arguing that "some of the most elaborate 'soft' international
law" is in the area of arms control).
89 See supra notes 29 and 30.
9' Williamson, supra note 29, at 64 (suggesting that "[t]he role of law in fostering compliance may be quite
different in bilateral arms control than in multilateral arms control"). Game theory suggests that in contrast to two-
player scenarios, multistate Prisoners' Dilemma may be more difficult for participants to overcome. Further com-
plications are created by increased monitoring costs and the likelihood ofincreased "undetected or unredressed free-
riding." JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (2006).
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In spite of the many proponents and purported advantages of soft law in other contexts, its
indeterminate dimension appears to be a dangerous choice for a design element in multilateral
disarmament regimes, particularly when member states face acute security dilemmas and effec-
tive transparency measures are not available. The classic security dilemma, in which efforts by
states to improve their own security lead other states to feel threatened, is heightened when
dual-use technology problems further obscure states' intentions and make it more difficult to
distinguish between defensive and offensive postures, the more so if offensive capabilities may
involve a devastating new military advantage. 91 While transparency measures designed to
detect and discourage cheating may assist a regime operating in such an environment, an even
more unstable environment for cooperation may be created by combining this lack of trans-
parency with reliance on indeterminate language. The impact of indeterminacy on egoist state
actors in these circumstances varies in accordance with the preferences underlying the strategies
of states participating in the regime.
A state's preferences for compliance with obligations under a security regime or for noncom-
pliance-referred to as "defection" from cooperation in game theory parlance-are often dif-
ficult to discern and defy rigorous scientific analysis. On the one hand, states are likely to have
some identifiable self-interested security objectives that inform their preferences and underlie
related weapons strategies. On the other hand, rationality does not necessarily provide a clear
and unambiguous guide to their behavior, since states may make different rational assessments
of their interests and of other states' actions. 92 It is this "conflict of rationalities" that has made
the Prisoners' Dilemma such a popular game theory for modeling international relations prob-
lems when states are uncertain about the actions of other state actors and must choose between
cooperation and defection, particularly in the context of security regimes.
93
Since the preferences of individual egoist state actors are based on their own imperfect assess-
ments of their interests and of other states' behavior, three broad groups of state actors that
reflect the sometimes overlapping preferences underlying weapons strategies constitute a useful
lens for evaluating the impact of indeterminacy and lack of transparency on multilateral dis-
armament regimes. These three groups, defensive defectors, offensive defectors, and compliant
or conformist states, are further divided into several subgroups for purposes of analysis.
Theproblem ofdefensive defection. Arms control agreements are often modeled as Prisoners'
Dilemmas in which fear of exploitation contributes to a dominant strategy of cheating by state
actors. 94 While the Prisoners' Dilemma is applied to many different types of international sit-
uations, certain characteristics of the security context make cooperation in the area of disar-
mament uniquely problematic and more likely to inspire defensive defections. The inherently
relative nature of military power creates intensely competitive conditions in a high-stakes secu-
rity environment with little room for error.95 Furthermore, state actors face difficulties in eval-
uating their own security and in accurately determining what other states are doing, especially
91 See Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167, 186-206 (1978).
92 STEIN, supra note 10, at 97. Thus, rational arguments may be made by states both for cooperation and for
defection in any particular situation. Id.
9' Id. While mutual cooperation is a Pareto-superior outcome to mutual defection, a state may also rationally
choose to pursue a dominant strategy of defection regardless of other states' actions or it may choose to defect on
a defensive basis to ensure that it at least achieves its maximum possible outcome in the context of feared nonco-
operation. Id.
94 Id. at 40.
9' See Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 27, at 173, 174.
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when offensive and defensive motives are hard to distinguish and often result in similar policies
perceived as threatening to other states.96 This potential for misperceiving the motives of other
states and taking actions that inadvertently threaten others can lead to a "spiral model" of inter-
national politics: the influence of both perceptual and structural factors on the interaction of
security-seeking states makes that security difficult for any of the actors to attain.97 Facing such
a security dilemma, a member of a multilateral disarmament regime may have to contend with
strong incentives to stage a successful surprise defection yet must remain on guard against hav-
ing its own national security interests seriously damaged by another state's possible defection.98
Commentators have suggested a variety of techniques and structures to assure the mutuality
of states' commitment to regimes and thus help to overcome the Prisoners' Dilemma in dif-
ferent areas of international concern.99 In the field of arms control, scholars have suggested that
fears giving rise to defensive defections may be decreased by a system of "assurance" measures
in which states inform potential adversaries about capabilities and facilitate or engage in actions
that demonstrate their continuing compliance with the regime's obligations. "o Any transpar-
ency measures designed to provide assurances, however, may be undermined by the substance
of those obligations. By using language designed to preserve flexibility and produce a widely
accepted multilateral disarmament convention, states may sacrifice determinacy and incur
costs that relate to the problem of defensive defections. On a foundational level, indeterminate
normative standards in international regimes may be said to entail significant legitimacy
costs101 while obfuscating what is expected of states for them to satisfy the regime's require-
ments.102 These qualities enhance neither overall confidence in a regime nor the ability of its
members to provide mutual assurances of compliance in highly unstable security conditions,
even if supported by strong transparency measures.
In addition to the uncertainty of states about the expectations regarding their compliance
with indeterminate provisions, a fundamental related problem is the type of commitment a
state signals by proposing an agreement containing such language. Other states that are asked
to rely on this type of commitment, particularly in a multilateral security context, are likely to
prefer an agreement that does a better job of providing assurances of compliance and demon-
strating costs that the proposing state would bear if the agreement were violated. "Credible
96 Id.
97 See Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate, 24 INT'L SECURITY 42,
49 (1999).
9s Chayes & Shelton, supra note 30, at 521.
99 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff& Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics ofHumanitarian Law Violations in
Internal Conflict, 93 AJIL 404 (1999) (suggesting that an agreement providing enhanced individual responsibility
for human rights violations in internal conflicts could overcome Prisoners' Dilemmas and help suppress incentives
for states to defect when it is accompanied by commitment techniques that provide some assurance that the agree-
ment will be performed, such as universal jurisdiction or some kind of mandatory "extraterritorial" jurisdiction);
Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1631-32 (2005) (suggesting that the Prisoners'
Dilemma may be overcome in some multilateral agreements by better ensuring iteration or an increased "shadow
of the future" by restricting exit opportunities).
.00 Abbott, supra note 9, at 4-5.
l' As Thomas Franck notes, indeterminacy also has costs and these costs are usually "paid in the coin of legit-
imacy." THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 53-54 (1990). Franck further
suggests that "[t]he degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of its perceived legitimacy," and that
"the more determinate the standard, the more difficult it is to resist the pull of the rule to compliance and to justify
noncompliance." Franck, supra note 12, at 716, 714.
102 FRANCK, supra note 101, at 54-55.
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commitments" are said to respond to this need and are often modeled in the Prisoners'
Dilemma and other theoretic game models involving strategic interaction, and have other
applications in contracting theory, business, and government. 10 3 In interest-based theoretic
models, international relations scholars use the term "credible commitment" to explain situ-
ations in which a state, after binding itself or otherwise constraining its ability to act, commu-
nicates this undertaking to another state to give that state an incentive to change its behavior.'" 4
To convey a credible commitment, the commitment a state makes in an international agree-
ment to help induce another state to behave as it otherwise might not have done must be per-
ceived by that other state as both genuine and costly to retract. Some scholars consider a legally
binding agreement with the highest degree of formality to be the most convincing way for a
state to express a credible commitment, and they view treaties and their related ratification pro-
cess as the best way for states to signal such intentions. 0 5 But the psychological effects of inde-
terminate language impair its ability to communicate such commitments even if packaged in
formal legal documents. As modeled in game theory and analyzed in bargaining dynamics,
imprecision ultimately undermines the credibility of both threats and promises however they
are expressed.' 0 6
Credible commitments and the overall prospects for successful cooperation by members of
disarmament regimes are weakened when key indeterminate provisions make the requirements
for compliance difficult to identify, further complicating existing security dilemmas. As shown
in iterated versions of theoretic game models, successful cooperation cannot emerge if players
are unable to recognize defection when it occurs.10 7 Recognition problems in theoretic game
models often translate into rule changes related to improved transparency or revised payoff
structures, but in this situation the same lack of clear definitions that obscures defection also
makes such rule changes ineffective.
In addition to the limited ability of various forms of soft law to convey credible commit-
ments, some of its purported advantages may also be illusory in the context of arms control and
disarmament agreements. One of the professed benefits of soft law is its ability to adapt to
change so that states can first commit themselves to various forms of discourse and procedure
103 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52 (1960); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 48-49 (1985).
104 See, e.g., James D. Fearon, SignalingForeign Policy Interests: TyingHands Versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 68 (1997); Slaughter et al., supra note 14, at 386 (noting how Institutionalists focus on credible commit-
ments in international relations theory as one of several mechanisms that can reduce the opportunity for cheating).
105 See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some InternationalAgreements Informal? 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 508, 511 (1991)
(noting that states use treaties to "signal their intentions with special intensity and gravity," to "underscore the dura-
bility and significance of the underlying promises," and as "a conventional way of raising the credibility of promises
by staking national reputation on adherence"); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agree-
ments: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113, 127 (2003).
1
0 6 JON HOVI, GAMES, THREATS & TREATIES 16 (1998); SCHELLING, supra note 103, at 21-52. In terms of
psychological mechanisms, experiments have demonstrated that a clear message that seems to make sense will be
accepted regardless of its source, while a message with less clear content is more likely to be accepted only if it comes
from a respected source. ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
123 (1976).
107 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 140 (1984) (suggesting that recognizing
defection is an important requirement in promoting cooperation and that the "scope of sustainable cooperation can
be expanded by any improvements in the players' ability to recognize each other from the past, and to be confident
about the prior actions that have actually been taken").
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that may eventually lead to the acceptance of deeper, legally binding rules;" 8 but the time con-
tinuum required for this successful transition is not at all certain, nor are the consequences of
delay in different areas of cooperation. In some cases, it is possible that the losses associated with
the increased propensity of states to violate soft law may not overshadow the gains from clearer
and more effectively monitored commitments. 9 Over time and in different contexts, how-
ever, soft law may prove to be less beneficial. In the case of multilateral disarmament agree-
ments that must regulate dual-use technology, soft design elements selected as short-term com-
promises will ultimately fail if they cannot address the fears and insecurity that generate strong
incentives for defensive defections.
Although various forms of soft law are promoted as superior design elements for regimes as
enabling states in the short term to bridge the gaps between technological uncertainties and
solutions, in the long term indeterminate soft law may in fact make it harder for states to man-
age risks associated with advances in technology in complex, legally binding arms control and
disarmament regimes. When the scope of technological challenges becomes more certain, the
parties to such agreements may be more likely to benefit from determinate provisions that
establish a mechanism for managing and sharing risks and can also more readily take advantage
of new technological improvements in related monitoring and verification capabilities.I"0
Bilateral arms control regimes in particular have demonstrated the importance of determinacy
in helping to adapt to new security and technology developments and thus preventing disputes
that could lead to defections."' Although dynamic changes under multilateral disarmament
regimes generally present a more complicated situation," 2 determinacy is a critical require-
ment for these regimes in successfully adapting to dynamic technological, political, and stra-
tegic changes and preventing these changes from inevitably enlarging perceptions of threat.
Defensive quasi-defectors. A variant of defensive defection may arise in multilateral disarma-
ment regimes when key rules are so vague or leave so much to discretion that states, especially
the most advanced industrial ones, may engage in activities that could appear to be unlawful
but arguably are consistent with their own self-serving interpretations of those rules. With their
advanced technology, these defensive "quasi-defectors" can exploit the soft limits of indeter-
minate restrictions through sophisticated auto-interpretation of a regime's scientific and tech-
nical requirements, pursuing advanced research projects with offensive applications under the
guise of strictly defensive measures.
108 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 446; Chayes & Shelton, supra note 30, at 526.
1"9 See Raustiala, supra note 19, at 611.
110 See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 107, at 140 (noting that the technical difficulties in monitoring nuclear explo-
sions and distinguishing them from earthquakes under applicable test ban treaties were eventually overcome by
advances in technology); Mohamed ElBaradei [IAEA director general], Nuclear Technology in a Changing World:
Have We Reached a Turning Point? (Nov. 3, 2005), at <http://www.iaea.org/Archive/DgStatements/
2005.html> (noting the key role of advanced technology in IAEA efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation,
such as the use of advanced nuclear forensic techniques to help to "reconstruct the chronology and nature of past
nuclear activity, and to verify the origin of the associated nuclear material").
... If the terms of a bilateral arms control agreement are sufficiently determinate, states have shown themselves
able to establish procedures to control related technology even if it is currently unknown. See, e.g., Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems, Agreed Interpretations, Common Understandings and Unilateral
Statements, Statement D, May 26, 1972, U.S.-USSR, 23 UST 3435,3456,944 UNTS 13 (committing the parties
to conduct additional negotiations with a view to establishing appropriate limitations for future antiballistic missile
systems if based on technologies utilizing physical principles not present at the time the treaty enters into force).
12 SeeEdwin M. Smith, UnderstandingDynamic Obligations:Arms ControlAgreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549,
1604 (1991).
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While a preference for defensive quasi defection by great powers may be motivated in part
by the same perceptions and fears that drive other states to pursue BW programs, it may also
be inspired by the forces that have inexorably driven powerful industrial states to conclude that,
as a matter of security policy, they must develop or acquire the most advanced science and tech-
nology with potential military applications. 1 1 3 Fearing technological inferiority itself and con-
fronted with an "asymmetric diffusion of military technology" that can give an innovator a sig-
nificant (if only temporary) advantage, great powers have historically sought the latest that
science can offer and the best military technology that their opponents might possess.11
In an earlier era when security under bilateral arms control agreements was firmly based on
mutual assured nuclear destruction, states sometimes intentionally cultivated uncertainty
about their new technological capabilities so as to suggest additional deterrent capabilities. In
the modern, post-Cold War environment where states confront security dilemmas under a
multilateral disarmament regime with only indeterminate obligations, actions that create
uncertainties about technological advances are more likely to inspire defections than deter-
rence.
Some legal scholars argue that precision itself is advantageous in international agreements,
primarily as it relates to review structures and as it is applied by institutions charged with sub-
sequently developing corresponding standards.115 However, in hard legally binding multilat-
eral disarmament regimes operating in highly unstable security environments, the effect and
significance of soft indeterminate provisions appears to extend beyond dependence on review
structures to affect the preferences and security policies of states by generally making obliga-
tions harder to understand, credible commitments harder to convey, and noncompliance
harder to recognize and easier to justify. Furthermore, while imprecision may not alter the for-
mal legal status of a legally binding agreement, it may make it possible for a state to use the
legality of the agreement itself to help create false expectations in other parties, thus assisting
a noncompliant state in more successfully cheating on its obligations.
Indeterminate language may also considerably affect the behavior of states under legally
binding arms control and disarmament agreements by creating loopholes through incomplete
regulation. Imprecise or otherwise indeterminate language may effectively leave some weapons
systems or related technology unregulated, just as some arms control and disarmament regimes
explicitly remove certain weapons systems or technology from their coverage. Since agreements
do not eliminate underlying state preferences and rivalries, language that fails to regulate
related and strategically attractive weapons systems has historically had the effect of channeling
arms races into those unregulated areas rather than ending the arms races themselves.' 16
13 As long as the possibility exists that conflict will be conducted by force, "competition in the arts and the instru-
ments of force" will take place. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ANARCHIC
ORDERS AND BALANCES OF POWER 180 (1979) (further suggesting that this competition will produce a tendency
toward sameness of competitors and that contending states will imitate the military innovations of the country of
greatest capability and ingenuity); see also JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS
231-32 (2001).
114 MEARSHEIMER, supra note 113, at 231.
115 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 19, at 583 n.10.
'16 See STEIN, supra note 10, at 133. A frequently cited example is the experience of the Washington Naval Arma-
ments Treaty of 1922 in which the major naval powers of the world agreed to limit the construction of a variety
of different types of ships then in existence, resulting immediately in a major arms race in the classes of ships not
covered by the agreement. Charles H. Fairbanks et al., Arms Control to Arms Reductions: The Historical Experience,
[Vol. 101:271
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF INDETERMINACY IN ARMS CONTROL REGIMES
Defensive Defectors and the BWC
Because the highly insecure environment in which offensive and defensive BW activities are
difficult to distinguish and misperceptions about dual-use biotechnology can aggravate secu-
rity dilemmas, states have historically had considerable incentives to develop their own BW
programs for defensive or deterrent purposes. The BWC regime, lacking any mandatory trans-
parency measures, also lacks structural mechanisms to provide assurances of compliance to
address those incentives, which may lead to a downward spiral of defections. This shortcoming
is magnified by key indeterminate terms that make it harder for states to give each other credible
commitments of compliance.
Inasmuch as the combination of soft structure and substance has made it difficult to detect
and define noncompliance, the existing BWC framework has proved to be a highly ineffective
design approach to reducing incentives for defensive defection in spite of its "hard" or legally
binding status. These difficulties, in turn, have created an unstable and corrosive atmosphere
of allegations and denials that has further diminished confidence in the regime and made it even
more difficult for regime members facing acute security dilemmas to provide each other with
assurances or credible commitments of compliance. Controversial, vague, and uncorroborated
allegations by the United States have been particularly destructive. 7 In the context of a regime
already diminished by admitted acts of cheating and the failure of its members to agree on any
appropriate reforms, continuing allegations of noncompliance aggravate the fears and misper-
ceptions that have historically generated BW arms races and risk a chain reaction of more defen-
sive defections that would create even more acute security dilemmas. 1 8 Confidence has been
further eroded by the continuing perception that the indeterminate BWC framework is
unequal to addressing dynamic technological changes. 1'9
The full scope of the problem of defensive defection under the BWC is impossible to estab-
lish through rigorous scientific methods. Clearly, however, numerous factors contribute to
such defections, including various regional and historical rivalries. More states in the Middle
East are widely considered to be of BW concern than in any other region of the world, making
conflicts there the most important regional rivalries to involve states with potential BW capa-
bilities.120 Most of the Middle Eastern states are BWC states parties. Those that are not parties
display a tentative or defensive legal posture toward biological weapons, having signed but not
WASH. Q., Summer 1987, at 59 (noting that the Washington Naval Treaty ironically encouraged the extraordi-
narily rapid emergence of the aircraft carrier).
1l7 Unsubstantiated allegations by the U.S. representative at the fifth review conference in 2001 that six spe-
cific states were pursuing illegal BW programs were accompanied by vague assertions of other noncompliant states
that were not publicly identified. See Bolton, supra note 83. These U.S. allegations were widely criticized as selective
and politically motivated. Richard Wolffe, US Names Iran as Chief State Sponsor of Terror, FIN. TIMES (London),
May 22, 2002, at 1. U.S. nonproliferation experts would also later claim that BW and other WMD intelligence had
been exaggerated to make a case for unilateral American action against countries such as Cuba and Iraq. Steven R.
Weisman, In Stricter Study, U.S. Scales back Claim on Cuba Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2004, at A5; Sonni Efron,
Harsh Critic of UN NamedAmbassador, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at Al.
i18 See Richard Falk, Inhibiting the Reliance on Biological Weaponry: The Role andRelevance ofInternationalLaw,
in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE, supra note 49, at 241, 244.
"9 As early as 1986, the BWC Conference of States Parties officially noted "apprehensions" about developments
in microbiology, genetic engineering, and biotechnology, but could not agree on any serious reforms to address
them. See Final Declaration, supra note 72, Art. I.
120 Egypt, Israel, and Syria are widely viewed by nonproliferation experts and many governments as having offen-
sive BW research programs or some level of BW capability. See supra note 85.
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ratified the BWC, while being obligated to refrain from the first use of biological weapons
under the Geneva Protocol. 121
Although a detailed examination of Middle Eastern security policies is beyond the purview
of this article, considerable evidence suggests that a variety of defensive and deterrent moti-
vations may inform the preferences of states there with respect to biological weapons. These
factors include the legacy of several conflicts that have involved the use of chemical weapons,
another weapon of mass destruction. 12 2 Even states that commentators frequently associate
with purely aggressive, expansionist, or offensive motives and policies, such as Iran123 and
Saddam Hussein's Iraq,' 24 may have decided to develop or maintain BW programs at least in
part to advance various defensive or deterrent objectives. Rather than being perceived by states
as an integral part of strategic or tactical offensive forces or as an effective means to threaten
other states, BW capabilities, on closer examination, may be of interest to many states in the
region largely on the basis of their perception of a dangerous environment. 125 To whatever
extent defensive or deterrent motives underlie preferences that lead states in the Middle East
or any other region to violate their BWC obligations, the regime remains inadequate to deal
with this problem, as key indeterminate language and a lack of transparency measures impede
the provision of assurances to reduce incentives for defensive defection.
Defensive Quasi Defectors and the BWC
As described above, fear of technological developments that could give an innovator a sig-
nificant advantage appears to have been a major factor contributing to the participation of
advanced industrial states in even the earliest BW arms races. The United States further justifies
its current development of advanced technology with BW applications by incorporating an
121 All states in the region are parties to the BWC except Egypt, Israel, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE); however, Egypt, Israel, and Syria are parties to the Geneva Protocol. See SIPRI, supra note 36. Egypt and
Syria have signed but not yet ratified the BWC. See BWC Web site, supra note 7. Although Israel is a nonsignatory,
it attends BWC review sessions as an observer.
122 One of these legacies in the Middle East appears to be that WMDs are most likely to be used against states
and populations that do not possess them, creating the strategic perception that the best deterrent against such weap-
ons is the ability to launch an in-kind response. Peter Sabin, Restraints on Chemical, Biological, andNuclear Use: Some
Lessonsftom History, in NON-CONVENTIONAL-WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE FAST: TACKLING
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 13,15 (Eftaim Karsh et al. eds., 1993)
[hereinafter NON-CONVENTIONAL-WEAPONS PROLIFERATION].
123 The alleged involvement of Iran in BW and CW programs apparently began as defensive measures in response
to the extensive and devastating use of chemical weapons against it during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and is
widely suspected of continuing. See Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acqui-
sition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January
Through 30June 2001 (2001), availableat <https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/archive/reports-200 1.html>. Iran's
interests in biological weapons thus did not originate in a strategy to use them to threaten other states in the region.
124 The considerable deterrent value that Iraq perceived with respect to its apparent chemical weapons capabilities
was extensively (and ironically) documented by U.S. investigators interviewing former Iraqi officials and reviewing
Iraqi government records after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. SeeTransmittal Message, in I COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQ'S WMD 1 (2004) [hereinafter CIA COMPREHENSIVE
REPORT], available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports /iraq_.wmd_2004/>. Saddam's view that WMDs had
helped to save his regime on multiple occasions helps explain why he "purposely gave an ambiguous impression
about possession as a deterrent to Iran," although this approach would have unexpected consequences for his regime
in its relations with both the United Nations and the United States. Id. at 9.
125 See Susan Wright & Richard Falk, RethinkingBiologicalDisarmament, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DIS-
ARMAMENT, supra note 55, at 413, 421.
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expansive version of self-defense in aggressive counterproliferation policies. Without determi-
nate criteria, the restrictive phrase "peaceful purposes" does nothing to moderate the incentives
powerful states may have to pursue questionable and expansive biodefense programs in pursuit
of technological superiority.
Revelations of formerly secret U.S. biodefense projects form an empirical framework for
examining the potentially limitless expanse of quasi cheating under the BWC and the related
negative effects of indeterminacy in the highly insecure BW environment. After a series of arti-
cles appeared in the New York Times in September 2001,126 the U.S. government admitted that
it had recently conducted two clandestine projects, and was planning a third, which were
designed to simulate offensive BW activities as part of U.S. biodefense efforts.127 Project
Bachus was managed by the Department of Defense and resulted in the construction of a fully
functional BW production facility at a Nevada test site. 128 Project Clear Vision was managed
by the Central Intelligence Agency and focused on building and testing a biological bomb
based on a Soviet design. 129 Project Jefferson was managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency
and resulted in plans to develop a modified, vaccine-resistant strain of anthrax modeled after
a Russian version. 30
The biodefense projects revealed in 2001, which were not declared by the United States
under applicable confidence-building measures, were widely criticized as either a clear viola-
tion of BWC obligations or a dangerous precedent that blurred the distinction between per-
missible defensive and prohibited offensive activities.' 3 1 In the aftermath of the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, several projects managed by the Department of Homeland Security and
undertaken at the newly established National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
apparently involved the production of "small amounts" of weaponized microbes (and perhaps
genetically engineered pathogens as well) and were also criticized as skirting the edges of BWC
obligations.' 32 U.S. government officials have defended all U.S. biodefense projects as being "in
compliance" with existing treaties. 133 Such claims, however, highlight both the lack of clear rules
under the BWC regime and the likelihood that powerful states will continue to use their advanced
126 Judith Miller et al., U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2001, at A 1; Judith
Miller, When Is a Bomb Not a Bomb? Germ Experts Confront U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, at A5 [hereinafter
Miller, Not a Bomb].
127 Victoria Clarke, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Regular Briefing
(Sept. 4, 2001), available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File.
128 Judith Miller, Next to Old Rec Hall, a 'Germ-MakingPlant,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,2001, atA6. Project Bachus
was designed to assess the difficulties in constructing a BW facility using only commercially available components
and to find out whether it emitted "signatures" for identification purposes. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 55, at
297-99; Miller et al., supra note 126.
129 MILLER ET AL., supra note 55, at 290-96; Miller et al., supra note 126.
130 MILLER ET AL., supra note 55, at 308-12; Vernon Loeb, U.S. Seeks Duplicate ofRussian Anthrax; Microbe
to Be Used to Check Vaccine, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2001, at A16.
131 See Miller, Nota Bomb, supra note 126 (quoting a former U.S. arms control official as saying that other coun-
tries would call it "a dangerous violation of the treaty," and that "it surely appears to be a violation of the treaty in
terms of common interpretation"); see also Seth Brugger, International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-weapons Research
Muted, 31 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2001, at 22, 22 (quoting a European official as saying that the projects
made "gray areas grayer still" when attempting to distinguish offensive from defensive activities under the BWC);
Oliver Meier, On the Wrong Side of the Line? BULL. ATOM. SC., Nov./Dec. 200 1, at 19, 21.
132 Joby Warrick, The Secretive FightAgainst Bioterror, WASH. POST, July 30, 2006, at Al (quoting one arms
control expert as saying that "[i]f we saw others doing this kind of research, we would view it as an infringement
of the bioweapons treaty").
133 Loeb, supra note 130.
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industrial capabilities to engage in quasi cheating to address perceived security threats or preemp-
tively seek technological superiority. Even ifa multilateral monitoring regime were present, the fail-
ure of the BWC clearly to define what is prohibited and what is "peaceful" leaves uncertain the
status of many sophisticated biodefense research programs, underscoring the importance of com-
bining determinate provisions and transparency measures to correct the regime's deficiencies.
The quest for technological BW superiority by powerful states that in turn leads to a quest for
technological dominance can, if unchecked, also manifest itself in a search for new pathogens that
"express traits that would render existing defenses useless." '34 Apparent U.S. efforts to develop
"defenses" under the BWC not only against known pathogens but also against imagined or futuristic
ones, as evidenced by work performed on a genetically modified form of vaccine-resistant anthrax,
are a case in point. 135 The lack of evidence that any terrorist organization has the resources to develop
genetically engineered bioweapons 1 36 has led some commentators to suggest that U.S. efforts to
develop such weapons in "biodefense programs" stem from other than purely defensive preferences.
In addition to creating or aggravating perceived security threats, novel pathogens that owe their
existence to the failure of indeterminate language in the BWC may also undermine overall BW non-
proliferation efforts by advancing societal acceptance of the idea that the generation of new biolog-
ical weapons is a normal and appropriate activity. 
1
37
The problem of incomplete regulation manifests itself in the BWC through the indetermi-
nate phrase "peaceful purposes." Like other limited disarmament agreements that have
inspired arms races in key areas that were not regulated, the BWC contains loopholes spawned
by indeterminate language that can encourage the most powerful states to use their advanced
technology to develop new biological weapons purportedly within those unregulated areas. By
dangerously blurring distinctions between offensive and defensive designs and creating new
and greater perceived BW threats for other states, these quasi defections further exacerbate the
security dilemmas under the BWC.
Hard Solutions for the B WC: App lying Determinacy to Defensive Defectors
As seen above, although some scholars suggest that a hard legally binding agreement with
the highest degree of formality is the most convincing way for states to signal a credible com-
mitment, 38 the formality of the treaty process actually allowed the Soviets to misrepresent the
importance and durability of their commitment, illustrating the dangers of relying on hard
legally binding agreements with soft substance and structure. 13 9 While arms control theory
posits that hard structures may also offer solutions to the problem of defensive defections, his-
tory suggests that even if mandatory transparency measures had been present, they would have
134 Susan Wright, Taking Biodefense Too Far, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 58, 63.
135 Id. at 63-64.
136 Leitenberg et al., supra note 86, at 3.
137 Wright, supra note 134, at 65.
138 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 105, at 124-25; see also Chayes & Shelton, supra note 30, at 526-27
(arguing that some evidence in arms control cases suggests that legally binding norms create their own compliance
pull and that "a norm in a treaty may induce more conforming state behavior than one that is purely non-binding").
139 Lipson, supra note 105, at 511 (noting that while treaty commitments can be used to deceive unwary states
and create false presumptions of compliance, "[i]nformal agreements are less susceptible to these dangers. They raise
expectations less than treaties and so are less likely to dupe the naive.").
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been undermined by the indeterminate standards in the BWC that make noncompliance dif-
ficult to recognize.140
If legally binding agreements and hard structures are insufficient, states may use hard, deter-
minate legal commitments themselves as instruments for providing assurances, particularly in
arms control regimes where the potential for damaging defections is high. To the extent that
the legally binding nature of commitments maybe used as an "exante sorting device" that helps
a state to identify itself as a party that is less likely to defect, determinate provisions in such a
commitment will probably make that device more credible and effective. 141 Closely related to
the role they can play as signaling and sorting devices, determinate provisions may provide fur-
ther assurances through their expected impact on states that are tempted to defect in highly
insecure environments. In this sense, determinate rules that clearly convey normative content
can improve confidence in a regime and reduce overall incentives for defection by encouraging
"gratification deferral." '14 2 If states in highly unstable security situations fear that their adver-
saries will be tempted to take advantage of opportunities to defect from cooperation under a
disarmament regime, parties are likely to choose to comply with the rules and forgo the grat-
ification of defection only if they have a longer-term interest in seeing a potentially beneficial
rule reinforced.143 States can be expected to defer the attainable short-term gains of defection
only if the regime's rules are sufficiently determinate to allow those states to foresee future sit-
uations in which the rules will operate to their advantage and benefits will be derived from
strengthening and complying with the rules in the present.144
Another potential advantage of determinacy in combating defensive defections in an
unstable security environment is its greater ability in some cases to deal with dynamic
changes. In 1972 the flexibility of imprecise language was perceived by the drafting states
(particularly the United States and the United Kingdom) as a mechanism for dealing with
a variety of risks and technological uncertainties. The potential character and scope of
advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering are now much better known, as is the
nature of the once-imagined BW threat. In addition, these advances not only create poten-
tial incentives for states to pursue BW programs, but also offer the possibility of new
restraints on their development through improved monitoring technology and verifica-
tion methods. 
1 45
140 This problem was demonstrated by the contentious efforts of the British, Americans, and Russians to inspect
each others' BW facilities in the early 1990s without the benefit of agreed BWC benchmarks. Seeinfra notes 181-83
and corresponding text.
141 Lipson, supra note 105, at 508 (noting that states desiring to signal a binding commitment use formal agree-
ments to raise the political costs of noncompliance and that these costs "are highest when the agreement contains
specific written promises"); seealso Raustiala, supra note 19, at 582 (noting how trade-offs between exante credibility
and expost flexibility are central to functionalist analysis).
142 See Franck, supra note 12, at 721 (noting that rules that lend themselves to broad interpretations, even for
humane or rational reasons, are "unlikely to inhibit any state from pursuing every opportunity for short-term inter-
est gratification"); Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution ofthe Normative Feed-
back Loop, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673, 706 (2001).
143 Franck, supra note 12, at 716.
144 Id.
145 Malcolm R. Dando, NewDevelopments in Biotechnologyand TheirImpacton Biological Warfare, in ENHANC-
ING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 21 (Oliver Thrinert ed., 1996) [hereinafter ENHANCING THE
BWC].
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The experience of bilateral arms control agreements demonstrates that the parties must be
able to address themselves to a number of "dynamic obligations" and must be prepared to mon-
itor and adapt to changes in both the strategic and the technological contexts. 146 Many of these
agreements involve highly determinate attempts to regulate weapons systems, together with
elaborate and intrusive inspection procedures that are structured to provide an adequate basis
for responding to such changes and minimizing the associated risks. A bilateral arms control
or multilateral disarmament regime that does not regulate clearly defined weapons, facilities,
and related materials can neither effectively transmit information to its members about mutual
compliance with obligations nor effectively communicate important political, technological,
or strategic changes related to those weapons in member states. Such changes may be partic-
ularly relevant in the BW context.
The ability of hard law to provide a basis for positively responding to dynamic changes may
be especially important in the Middle East where, as previously noted, there appear to be incen-
tives for defensive defection from the BWC. Determinacy, together with legally binding trans-
parency measures, might assist both in providing better assurances of compliance to states and
reducing incentives for defection, and in promoting deeper cooperation by taking advantage
of new political, technological, or strategic developments that relate to diminished or reeval-
uated interest in biological weapons in the region.
Several recent developments, including the confirmed elimination of all weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq 4 7 and the apparent abandonment of all WMD programs in Libya, may
now provide an impetus for states in the Middle East to reappraise the utility of BW programs
and the desirability of joining legal regimes to prohibit them. Many of the same factors that
have historically limited the effectiveness of biological weapons elsewhere have an even larger
presence in the Middle East, making BW unlikely weapons of choice there, thus potentially
the subject of greater and more willing regulation by states.148 Some commentators have
observed that BW programs may be less attractive to many states in the region than has been
assumed.14 9 Moreover, as Egypt and Israel appear to be taking renewed, if only tentative, steps in
the direction of increased cooperation regarding the BWC,15 0 determinacy and transparency
146 Smith, supra note 112, at 1582. As regards regulation of future technologies, see supra note 111.
147 With its demonstrated ballistic missile technology, proclivity for CW use, and previously declared BW arse-
nal, Saddam Hussein's Iraq constituted a particularly difficult strategic predicament for states in the region, espe-
cially for Israel. Avner Cohen, Israel: Reconstructing theBlack Box, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT,
supra note 55, at 181, 192-95.
148 Id. at 190 (noting that Israeli military strategists reportedly concluded that biological weapons could not be
relied on for strategic deterrence or as an effective strategic or tactical military weapon, especially since most wars
in the Middle East have been decisively terminated in a matter of days and leave no military use for "such uncertain
weapons with a long incubation time"). The proximity of interdependent populations in a relatively small space has
led others to argue that the use of WMDs such as biological weapons in the Middle East would be "highly irrational."
Yezid Sayigh, Middle Eastern Stability and the Proliferation of Weapons ofMass Destruction, in NON-CONVENTION-
AL-WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, supra note 122, at 179, 180.
149 See Jonathan B. Tucker, Motivationsfor andAgainst Proliferation: The Case ofthe Middle East, in BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE, supra note 75, at 27, 33-35 (noting the uncertain military utility of biological weapons, the significant
difficulties in delivering and preserving them in adverse meteorological conditions, and their very limited deterrent
value compared to other WMDs and even conventional weapons). Experts note that Israel in particular, because
of its nuclear weapons capability, now has little strategic reason to maintain BW capabilities or a posture of"CBW
ambiguity." Cohen, supra note 147, at 202.
150 Despite Egypt's status as only a BWC signatory state and Israel's status as a nonsignatory observer, both coun-
tries participated in the fifth and sixth review conferences and Egypt actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc
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appear to be critical and timely tools for making the BWC framework better able to provide assur-
ances, reduce incentives for defection, and positively reflect dynamic changes in the security envi-
ronment. In the absence of such reforms, voluntary, self-reporting CBMs such as those now
attached to the BWC do little to enhance cooperation and may instead be used or perceived as a
source of disinformation that can worsen suspicions and give rise to more defensive defections.15 1
Hard Solutions for the B WC: Applying Determinacy to Defensive Quasi Defectors
While quasi defections are less likely to occur if transparency and determinacy are incorpo-
rated into the BWC regime, a powerful state may be deterred from adopting a hard law
approach for any multilateral disarmament regime by various trade-offs that include forgoing
perceived national security benefits derived from the continued exploitation of indeterminate
language and structural deficiencies in transparency. At the same time, determinate rules and
mandatory transparency provisions will probably not be adopted and succeed in the BWC
without the support of the great powers, which is likely to be based on a calculated judgment
that multilateral regulation is superior to individualistic behavior. 152 Such a judgment may
involve various factors but will doubtless depend on a self-interested evaluation by each state
of its national security interests. To forgo individualistic security measures, states such as the
United States must perceive such measures as more costly than the burdens imposed by deter-
minate hard law, increased multilateral regulation, and the resulting sovereignty costs. Hard
law often incurs sovereignty costs by fundamentally encroaching on a state's exclusive control
over matters such as national security. 153 Furthermore, even a limited delegation of authority,
such as of certain responsibilities to an outside monitoring organization, may entail additional
or unanticipated sovereignty costs. 154 These costs will probably be important factors in eval-
uating the trade-offs inherent in choices along a continuum of options that include various
dimensions of what can be described as hard and soft law.1
55
While a political Realist might suggest that the U.S. rejection of the BWC draft protocol
resulted inevitably from the prevalence of national interests over those of a multilateral regime,
powerful states may nonetheless join such a regime and embrace determinate, hard law com-
mitments if they decide to seek long-term security benefits over maximizing short-term or
myopic interests.' 56 The United States is one of many states that support the principles and
objectives of the BWC; it begins its evaluation of the long-term benefits with strong incentives
Group. Three signatories in the region, Egypt, Syria, and the UAE, were also invited to participate in the preparatory
work for the sixth review conference.
151 See Laura Drake, The Middle East: Integrated RegionalApproaches to Arms Control and Disarmament, in BIO-
LOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 55, at 151, 166-67.
152 Jervis, supra note 95, at 176.
153 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 438 ("Even the most powerful states recognize that legalization will
circumscribe their autonomy.").
154 Id.
155 General, but unexplained, concerns about such costs were expressed by the United States in rejecting the final
composite text of the BWC draft protocol in 2001. SeeJohn R. Bolton, The U.S. Position on the Biological Weap-
ons Convention: Combating the BW Threat (Aug. 26, 2002), at <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/13090.htm>
(saying that the draft protocol "would have compromised national security").
156 Noting that Realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau have observed that "the national interest wins out over the
international objective" in many areas, Robert Keohane suggests that such views ignore the possibility that states
may nonetheless choose international cooperation by defining their interests more broadly and by eschewing imme-
diate or "myopic" interests. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 99 (1994).
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to make the BWC regime more effective and to discourage BW proliferation, even at the
expense of some immediate interests.' 57 Further, the United States originally led efforts to
strengthen the BWC and has accepted hard law commitments and subjected itself to intrusive
inspection and monitoring measures under other arms control and disarmament agreements
like the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).158 Notwithstanding the advancement of
many worthy goals, this apparent self-abnegation is likely to have been based on a rational and
studied pursuit by the United States of its own security interests. Such efforts also involved a
view of long-term interests that does not appear to have been dominated by any one American
business interest, unlike the influence apparently exercised by the U.S. pharmaceutical indus-
try with respect to BWC reform initiatives.
In contrast to the national security benefits that may flow from determinacy and transpar-
ency, powerful states may incur national security costs in choosing to continue the individ-
ualistic pursuit of expansive biodefense programs under the indeterminate provisions of the
BWC. For example, biodefense programs may themselves present troubling limitations and
risks relevant to calculating the costs of national security trade-offs. While these programs are
strongly supported by the U.S. government, many BW experts argue that it is virtually impos-
sible to protect an entire civilian population from a surprise biological attack and note that this
problem contributed to the original decision by the United States to renounce its BW programs
in 1969.'59 Vaccination programs are problematic since they are unlikely to be able to develop
and administer effective vaccines to protect a civilian population against a variety of specific
unknown biological agents.16 ° On the other hand, vaccines are essential for personnel working
on offensive BW programs and may be viewed as particularly suspect by other countries when
they are developed by military organizations. 16 1 Countermeasures against those vaccines can
also lead to qualitative BW proliferation, as states attempt to circumvent the protection pro-
vided by other states' immunization programs. 162 Even if states believe they are taking legit-
imate defensive actions, without agreed-upon determinate rules and transparency measures,
extensive biodefense programs such as those pursued in new U.S. secret research centers may
157 Id. at 107.
158 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21 (1993), 32 ILM 800 (1993) [hereinafter
CWC].
159 See Laura Reed & Seth Shulman, A Perilous Path to Security? Weighing US. "Biodefense"Against Qualitative
Proliferation, in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 55, at 57, 59. The unpredictable nature
of the threat and the related inability of civil biodefense to prevent outbreaks from spreading out of control were
important factors in the U.S. decision to renounce BW programs in 1969 and have continued to inform U.S. BW
policy since that time. Id. at 59-60.
160 Id. at 72 ("[I]t has been frequently pointed out that vaccines are useful only in the face of positive intelligence
with respect to the nature of the hostile agent; similarly, treatment with drugs such as antibiotics is useful only for
bacteria and only after the isolation and testing of the organism.").
161 See Victor W. Sidel, DefenseAgainst Biological Weapons: Can Immunization andSecondary Prevention Succeed?
in BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 55, at 77,81 (noting that other nations may negatively
view the intense interest shown by U.S. military researchers in vaccines intended to counter specific and rare organ-
isms that are unlikely to cause public health problems unless intentionally spread); Richard Novick & Seth Shul-
man, New Forms of Biological Warfare? in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE, supra note 49, at 103, 112
(noting that since vaccines are more useful against agents contemplated for use as offensive weapons, their possession
inevitably serves to "unbalance the international biological warfare situation"); see also Jonathan King & Harlee
Strauss, The Hazards of Defensive Biological Warfare Programs, in id. at 121.
162 Reed & Shulman, supra note 159, at 68; see also Sidel, supra note 161, at 81 (noting that such circumvention
appears to have motivated the Russians' search for a new strain of anthrax).
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easily raise suspicions in other countries that will exacerbate already dangerous security dilem-
mas.16 3 These concerns, together with fears about the safety and security of biodefense pro-
grams, have led some scientists to conclude that a more effective defense against these weapons
may be improving the overall effectiveness of public health programs in the United States.' 64
A final national security trade-off that may be implicated by a powerful state's rejection of
hard law to exploit the indeterminacy of the BWC is the inadvertent role of expansive biode-
fense programs in helping terrorist groups to acquire biological weapons. This threat appears
to merit significant consideration in current U.S. national security calculations in light of the
likely involvement of advanced, state-run biodefense labs in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks.
Effective biological weapons capable of causing catastrophic casualties remain difficult to pro-
duce and deploy, and terrorist groups probably cannot launch such attacks on their own.
165
Accidents at U.S. biodefense facilities may pose another threat to public health and national
security, as evidenced by recent incidents involving the reappearance of relatively rare infec-
tious diseases in America linked to state-run BW research facilities and state-funded BW
research projects.166
IV. INDETERMINATE ARMS CONTROL REGIMES AND OFFENSIVE DEFECTORS
Indeterminate Rules, Cheaters, and Rogues
One much-analyzed preference, modeled in game theory, that is displayed by some
states is to defect offensively from regime cooperation, that is, to cheat secretly and thus
secure an advantage over other states that remain bound by the obligations of that regime.
Indeterminate provisions that leave the rules of cooperation uncertain and make it easier
to evade obligations are tempting devices for states to use in pursuing strategies based on
163 See Warrick, supra note 132 (noting that critics of the NBACC fear that "its work fuels suspicions that could
lead other countries to pursue secret biological research"). Such suspicions are increased by the close ties of the
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center to the U.S. intelligence community and the assignment
ofspecial CIA advisers to the lab. Id. While national security officials may be quick to draw inferences about aggres-
sive behavior from the military posture of adversary states, they are often not inclined to apply this reasoning to their
own behavior, incorrectly assuming that other states are aware of their peaceful intentions and see no threat or men-
ace in their actions. JERVIS, supra note 106, at 68.
164 Choffnes, supra note 4, at 29 (arguing that expanding U.S. biodefense activities risks training and equipping
would-be bioterrorists).
165 Id. (noting that "[t]errorists who want to mount a major attack with bioweapons would need substantial help
from state sponsors to do so"); Malcolm Dando, The Bioterrorist Cookbook, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Nov./Dec. 2005,
at 34, 36 (describing "barriers to entry" as potentially quite high for terrorists seeking to develop "weapons on a
destructive scale comparable to those developed by states for military use"); DANA A. SHEA & FRANK GOTTRON,
SMALL-SCALE TERRORIST ATTACKS USING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS: AN ASSESSMENT FRAME-
WORK AND PRELIMINARY COMPARISONS, at CRS-11 (Congressional Research Service, 2004), available at
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/33629.pdf> (noting that some experts suggest that "development
ofweaponized biological agents presents remarkably high hurdles, particularly in mass dissemination, which would
require teams of scientists with state backing to overcome").
166 For example, the disease glanders had not been reported in English-language medical literature since 1949
until a young microbiologist was hospitalized in Maryland in March 2004. This incident reportedly occurred in
the context of "research on agents of biological warfare." Arjun Srinivasan et al., Glanders in a Military Research
Microbiologist, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 256, 256 (2001) (further noting that labs face difficulties in recognizing
potential agents of biological warfare and that this case may serve as a harbinger of the resurgence of nearly forgotten
diseases). In another incident in 2004, three laboratoryworkers at Boston University were exposed to the bacterium
that causes tularemia. The workers were reportedly working on a vaccine to protect against bioterrorist attacks. Scott
Shane, Exposure at Germ Lab Reignites a Public Health Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at A13.
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this preference. 1 67 Structural mechanisms including assurance devices that might other-
wise be relevant to this problem will probably not be of assistance once a state adopts defec-
tion as its dominant strategy since in effect such a state is no longer an interdependent actor
that can be influenced by the correction of misperceptions through confidence-building
measures or other mechanisms for dispensing useful information about compliance. 6 8
The need to reduce the likelihood of successful offensive defections in these circumstances
primarily implicates intrusive inspection, monitoring, and other "verification" measures
rather than assurance devices, particularly when states fear that other states have achieved,
or may achieve, significant technological advances related to the development of advanced
weapons systems. 6 9 When a preference for cheating is adopted, however, indeterminacy
in key provisions can undermine these structural safeguards by making it more difficult
to detect and identify violations.
A subgroup of offensive defectors could be characterized as states that maintain a preference
not only for violating their obligations under a specific arms control or disarmament regime,
but also for disregarding their legal obligations generally. States that engage in aggressive, defi-
ant, and lawless behavior have been given numerous labels but are often described by U.S. gov-
ernment officials and many other commentators as "rogue states."17 While the term "rogue
state" has no international legal standing and has been defined and used in many different
ways,171 it is used here to characterize a state as "a perennial violator" of international rules. 1
72
Such states may have various reasons for violating international norms and rules, including
overall dissatisfaction with the status quo,' 7 3 yet their motives are often described as "irratio-
nal." 174 If rogue states are irrational actors, they are presumably even less likely than other
defecting states to respond to assurances, threats, or any other information from or about their
167 Franck, supra note 12, at 714, 718.
168 See STEIN, supra note 10, at 65.
169 Abbott, supra note 9, at 16 (noting that concern for offensive defections will be especially pronounced when
states fear technological advances by other states that are "capable of producing one-time gains large enough to offset
the likely future costs or, in the extreme case, to end the game").
170 The Department of State abandoned the term "rogue state" in 2000 in favor of other terms such as "state of
concern." See Robert S. Litwak, What's in a Name? The ChangingForeign Policy Lexicon, 54 J. INT'L AFF. 375,377,
379 (2001). The term has since been resurrected by the Bush administration and used prominently in official policy
statements. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (Sept. 2002), available at <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html> [hereinafter 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY] ("new deadly chal-
lenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists").
171 The term "rogue state" has been so overused that some scholars have argued that it is often little more than
"an ideological tag with no content." Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the
Charter Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 735, 735 (2002).
172 Id.; see also 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 170, at 14.
'73 Although the terms "rogue state" and "revisionist state" are sometimes used interchangeably, a revision-
ist state is best defined as a rational one that nonetheless takes risks and violates international norms in an effort
to change the status quo, as exemplified by imperial Japan and Nazi Germany and their use of force to achieve
greater power and influence in the 1930s. See Richard Falk, Re-framing the LegalAgenda of World Order in the
Course ofa Turbulent Century, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 451, 458 (1999). While rogue states
are also likely to be dissatisfied with the status quo, they tend to be marginal actors that threaten regional sta-
bility without the capabilities of a Hitler or a Stalin to challenge the entire international system. See Lirwak,
supra note 170, at 387.
174 For example, North Korea is a rogue state that is often characterized by U.S. government officials and other
commentators as irrational. See Denny Roy, North Korea andthe Madman Theory,' 25 SECURITY DIALOGUE 307,
316 n. 15 (1994) (noting that "the great majority of analysts implicitly or explicitly accept the premise of North
Korean irrationality"); see also Victor D. Cha, Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,
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adversaries, including attempts at deterrence. 175 This conduct is consistent with theoretic
game models suggesting that threats of penalties for noncompliance are not likely to be effec-
tive against irrational actors.' 76 Similarly, U.S. national security policies emphasizing preemp-
tive military action reflect the perceived irrationality of rogue states and their inability to be
deterred. 177 By definition rogue states are not inclined to cooperate with other states or to
comply with the obligations of a legal regime, arguably making even the most strictly enforced,
verifiable, and hard legal obligations irrelevant to their conduct.
The presumed inability of any diplomatic or legal initiatives to influence the behavior
of rogue states remains dependent on the characterization of these states as irrational
actors. If instead they are motivated by any rational preferences, such as a desire to obtain
economic concessions or technical assistance in exchange for compliance, indeterminate
provisions cannot yield the clear rules needed to establish workable arrangements with
other regime members to facilitate such exchanges. Distinguishing between activities that
must be abandoned and those that may be assisted will probably be impeded by indeter-
minate provisions, especially if alleged violators can claim an inalienable or guaranteed
right to pursue various peaceful activities involving dual-use materials, such as chemical
components, biological agents, and nuclear technology, under applicable multilateral
disarmament regimes.
Offensive Defectors and the BWC
Confronting the unrelenting efforts of states to maximize their relative power to secure their
survival, the designers of international security regimes have long struggled with the problem
of offensive defectors. While assurance measures are most closely linked with efforts to address
defensive defections through the exchange of useful information related to compliance, more
intrusive methods such as on-site inspections are often described as "verification" measures and
are commonly associated with efforts to improve compliance by detecting cheating by states
engaged in offensive defection. 178 In both practice and theory, however, these two systems are
closely related and are often combined in arms control and disarmament agreements so as to
promote transparency more effectively. 179 In attempting to remedy the much-criticized struc-
tural deficiencies of the BWC in this respect and to address the problem of potential offensive
27 INT'L SECURITY 40, 46 (2002) (noting that the irrationality of the North Korean regime is commonly argued
to be a threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula).
75 See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375 (2004); Elaine Sciolino & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Study Reopens Division over Nuclear
Missile Threat, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2000, at Al (quoting senior U.S. officials as rejecting deterrence against coun-
tries like North Korea because their leaders were "capable of irrational self-destructive behavior").
176 See SCHELLING, supra note 103, at 130.
171 In contrast to strategies for dealing with a status quo adversary in the Cold War, U.S. policy was revised in
2002 to reflect the view that "deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders
of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations."
2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 170, at 15.
17s Abbott, supra note 9, at 4.
179 Id. at 5. States will often have reasons to use both systems. Many bilateral arms control regimes are designed
to mesh with various other external monitoring procedures and capabilities (such as satellites or other "national tech-
nical means"), the most extensive verification measures being dependent on the active cooperation of the parties
under observation. Id.
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defections, the rejected BWC draft protocol envisioned a hybrid system of both assurance and
verification measures. 
180
The current BWC framework appears to offer an inviting target for offensive defectors, as
demonstrated by the ability of the Soviet Union and Iraq to develop illicit BW programs. While
undetected cheating in such cases may often highlight the lack of transparency measures, the
historical experience of the BWC also suggests that a lack of determinate rules and require-
ments will impede attempts to establish a meaningful verification process. Thus, in 1992 the
United States, Britain, and Russia undertook to ascertain BWC compliance through a series
ofvoluntary visits to nonmilitary sites of concern under the nonbinding "Trilateral Framework
Agreement."181 This process quickly ended in failure after several visits demonstrated Russia's
unwillingness to give a full account of Soviet BW activities and accusations by both sides only
intensified mutual suspicions. 182 The absence of determinate rules or criteria contributed sub-
stantially to this failure, as participants could not agree on the implications of what they had
observed during their visits.183
Even with transparency measures and determinate rules, the BWC regime would presum-
ably not be able to affect offensive defectors characterized as "rogue" or outlaw states whose
pursuit of BW programs is based on irrational motives. North Korea, for example, is often
described as a particularly dangerous rogue and is also regarded by many governments and
experts as a state of BW concern.
184
In rejecting the BWC protocol, the U.S. government argued that a reformed BWC
with access to some level of monitoring and clearer requirements would not deter deter-
mined cheaters and specifically accused North Korea of being such a cheater. 18 5 While the
United States also purportedly based this rejection on perceived flaws in the text and addi-
tionally cited the overarching concerns of the pharmaceutical industry, to the extent that
it relied on the argument that such reforms cannot counter rogue states it remains depen-
dent on the core assumption that these would-be cheaters are irrational and cannot be
influenced by diplomatic efforts, or that arms control measures are useless in this area
against any state, or both. The U.S. government continues to emphasize that no arms con-
trol or disarmament regime would deter any state that is determined to engage in illicit
180 The BWC draft protocol incorporated many of the twenty-one identified verification and assurance measures
recommended by VEREX. See supra note 74.
181 David C. Kelley, The TrilateralAgreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification, 2002 VERIFICATION
Y.B. (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre) 93, 96-97.
182 Id.; see also Moodie, supra note 70, at 66. U.S. officials found what they considered to be clear evidence of
continuing offensive BW programs during their visits to several Russian facilities. Contentious Russian visits to
Pfizer Corporation facilities in Indiana and Connecticut later resulted in accusations by Russian state media that
Pfizer was producing biological weapons. See MILTON LEITENBERG, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL
11 n. 17 (PRAC Paper No. 16, 1996), available at <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/prac.pdf>. Although
the trilateral process began in 1992, no further visits occurred after 1994 owing to disagreements over visits to mil-
itary facilities.
183 Moodie, supra note 70, at 66.
184 See Bolton, supra note 83. For the findings of nonproliferation and research institutes regarding possible or
alleged North Korean BW programs, see supra note 85. North Korea was also designated by the United States as
a dangerous member of an "axis of evil." George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29,2002), 38 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. DOC. 133, 135 (Feb. 4, 2002), available at <http://www.gpoacces.gov/sou/index.html>.
185 See supra note 85.
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biological weapons development,18 6 a view that conforms with a visceral dislike of inter-
national regimes that has sometimes been famously reflected in other comments by key
U.S. officials. This attitude presents the question whether a stronger BWC regime would
offer any benefits in addressing the threat of determined offensive defectors and what costs
or trade-offs, if any, would be incurred by adopting more determinate provisions and man-
datory transparency measures.
Hard Solutionsfor the B WC: Applying Determinacy to Offensive Defectors
The possibility of mixed motives and their importance. Selecting design elements for an effec-
tive international regime is difficult when some members appear to have a preference for offen-
sively defecting from cooperation to secure advantages over others. Even in such cases, how-
ever, the possible nuances in each state's preferences must be carefully evaluated if more
effective legal regimes and sustained cooperation are to be achieved. ' 8 7 Rather than reflecting
a single motivation, the behavior of most states is more likely to be based on a constellation or
combination of preferences. 88
Russia is a country that may harbor a combination of preferences related to its BW programs.
To the extent that it apparently continues to pursue offensive BW programs that it inherited
from the Soviet Union, a preference for offensive defection remains a highly plausible moti-
vation for some Russian actions.' 89 But Russia may also have some of the "great power" motives
of a defensive quasi defector like those displayed by the United States, exploiting the indeter-
minate language of the BWC to be the first to acquire new, arguably permitted military tech-
nology and so avoid the unknown risks of any technological inferiority. '90 In addition, Russia
may be influenced somewhat by defensive or deterrent motives, and some writers even suggest
that the Soviets were influenced by such factors.' 9 ' Finally, to some degree Russia may share
some of the interests of many compliant states in ensuring the nonproliferation of biological
weapons.
1 9 2
186 Robert G. Joseph, under secretary of state for arms control and international security, Remarks to Carnegie
International Nonproliferation Conference (Nov. 7, 2005), available at <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/
56584.htm> ("The traditional arms control verification approach .... would not have deterred those who would
seek to violate the [Biological Weapons] Convention.").
187 See Jervis, supra note 97, at 42, 53.
188 STEIN, supra note 10, at 48. Even ancient Athens, whose aggressive conquests as recounted by Thucydides
continue to be related by modern political Realists, was influenced by a combination ofdifferent motives. See Speech
oftheAthenians, in 1 SIMON HORNBLOWER, A COMMENTARY ON THUCYDIDES i.75.3, at 120 (1991) ("fear was
our first motive, afterwards honour, and finally advantage").
189 The Russian Ministry of Defense steadfastly continues to refuse to allow any access to four of its facilities (in
Kirov, Sergiev Posad, Ekaterinburg, and St. Petersburg) that appeared to be at the center of the Soviet offensive BW
program. See Rimmington, supra note 57, at 117.
19' According to a prominent defector involved in the post-BWC Soviet BW program, many Soviet generals were
not originally convinced of the military utility of biological weapons but felt that it was "dangerous, if not outra-
geous, to be behind the West in anything." See KEN ALIBEK WITH STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIOHAZARD 41
(1999).
'91 There is some evidence even suggesting that the U.S. government may have deliberately attempted to create
a false impression of continuing work on BW programs to encourage the Soviets to dedicate resources on BW work
rather than on other military programs. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Polyakov's Run, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Sept./Oct.
2000, at 40; Rimmington, supra note 57, at 109.
192 See Leonid A. Skotnikov, permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disar-
mament, Statement to the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC (Nov. 19, 2001), available
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The Russian BWC case illustrates the difficulties in discerning the specific preferences of
states, especially when they may have incentives for secrecy and misrepresentation. To the
extent, however, that states like Russia may be more than pure offensive defectors and may be
motivated by a combination of preferences, determinacy and transparency in the BWC are
likely to promote their cooperation with other similarly motivated parties. Strategies based on
a more complicated set of preferences may account for Russia's continuing support of a legally
binding multilateral monitoring agreement to strengthen the BWC and its insistence that such
a document incorporate more precise or objective terms. 
19 3
The rogue or outlaw state. Although North Korea is often characterized as an irrational
rogue or outlaw state and thus not influenced by factors that affect the behavior of other self-
interested states, a considerable amount of unpredictable, risky, or apparently irrational behav-
ior by rogue states has been seen to be the product of miscalculations or misassessments.'
94
Using the term "rogue" to attribute irrationality to a potentially diverse group of aggressive or
lawless states and then relying on that designation to establish policies may obscure an under-
standing of the individual motives or preferences that underlie the actions of each of these
states. 195
While the intensely secret and closed nature of the North Korean government defies efforts
to explain its behavior or analyze its preferences fully, a sizable body of evidence suggests that
rational decisions may nonetheless underlie many, if not all, of its strategies,1 96 all the more
since its aggressive and threatening behavior has often served it well in its negotiations with
more powerful countries. 197 A rational state may find it quite useful to appear irrational,
stubborn, or angry in avariety ofcircumstances.' 9 A combination of rational motives may
therefore underlie many North Korean preferences, including those related to BW activities, which
at BWC Web site, supra note 7 (expressing concern about BW proliferation, calling for approval of legally binding
multilateral verification measures for the BWC, and noting the enactment of criminal sanctions and export control
laws to implement the BWC in Russia).
193 Id. ("[Wie would like to emphasize once more the importance that we have been and still are giving to the
inclusion of terminology and objective criteria into the Protocol.").
194 Predicting other states' capabilities and intentions involves inherent uncertainties and a "probabilistic assess-
ment of an uncertain and unknown future," potentially leading to "bad predictions, miscalculations, and mis-
assessments" by any state actor, including a rogue state. See STEIN, supra note 10, at 60-61.
195 See Litwak, supra note 170, at 376, 379 (arguing that in the absence of a Cold War adversary, U.S. policy-
makers have used the term "rogue state" to demonize a disparate group ofstates in an effort to mobilize international
and domestic political support for the adoption of "hard-line policies" against these states, potentially obscuring a
better understanding of these states and distorting policy); see generally Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Differentiated
Containment, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 20.
196 Some critics question the assumption that the North Korean regime is irrational when it clearly seems inter-
ested in its own self-preservation and the United States has successfully contained it on the Korean Peninsula for
many years. See Jihwan Hwang, Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union
andNorth Korea in Comparative Perspective, WORLD AFF., June 22, 2005, at 39; David C. Kang, Rethinking North
Korea, 35 ASIAN SURvEY 253 (1995); Steven Mufson, Threat of'Rogue'States: Is ItReality orRhetoric? WASH. POST,
May 29, 2000, at Al.
197 Although North Korea is criticized for taking irrational risks, some commentators argue that it is a classic
example of the effective use of threats, bluffs, blackmail, and brinksmanship to create crises in order to extract max-
imum concessions from more powerful countries. SCOTT SNYDER, NEGOTIATING ON THE EDGE (1999); Roy,
supra note 174.
1' Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory ofCustomarylnternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1135
(1999) ("Weak states with idiosyncratic domestic arrangements-like Iraq, Serbia, or North Korea-may benefit
from being unpredictable or irrational."); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Com-
peting Conceptions ofInternational Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 16, at 49, 55.
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presents possibilities for self-interested North Korean participation in a reformed BWC regime.
Recent initiatives by the United States to engage Iran and North Korea by offering various incen-
tives for better behavior, while hardly enthusiastic, suggest fundamental reconsideration by U.S.
officials of the presumption of the irrationality of rogue states.1 99
One potentially important self-interested motive behind some alleged WMD activities of North
Korea may be the desire to obtain maximum advantages or compensation from the international
community in exchange for its participation in disarmament regimes, 20 0 an approach facilitated by
regimes that guarantee states the right to pursue "peaceful" research, development, exchange, and
other activities closely related to prohibited undertakings. The BWC offers such guarantees,20 ' as
do other agreements like the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
20 2
Under this type of regime, a state might demand concessions for an agreement to forgo otherwise
permitted "peaceful" activities, arguing that full enjoyment of such activities would represent
a trade-off or a form of "compensation" for the state's original willingness to subject itself
to the terms of a disarmament agreement.20 3
Given the unproven military utility of biological weapons and the inherent limitations of
a BW arsenal serving as an effective strategic deterrent, particularly when compared with
nuclear weapons, 2 4 North Korea could rationally conclude that BW programs are not essen-
tial for national security purposes yet at the same time decide that demonstrating full compli-
ance with BWC obligations could be profitable. The incentives for a rogue state to behave in
this way are potentially greater than for it to engage in any type of genuine security cooperation,
199 See Peter Baker & Anthony Faiola, U.S., S. Korea Find UnityAgainst North's Nuclear Arms Program, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at A20 (noting how two years of six-party negotiations resulted in an offer of "economic
incentives" in exchange for abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons program). On February 13, 2007,
North Korea is reported to have agreed to take certain incremental steps with respect to its nuclear programs, includ-
ing shutting down the Yongbyang reactor and readmitting international nuclear inspectors, in exchange for energy
aid and other inducements. Glenn Kessler & Edward Cody, US. Flexibility Creditedin Nuclear Deal with N. Korea,
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2007, at A 11. In the aftermath of an apparent North Korean nuclear weapons test, the UN
Security Council appears to continue to display a belief in the ability of North Korea to make rational assessments
by imposing a variety of sanctions designed to change its behavior. See SC Res. 1718 (Oct. 14, 2006). With respect
to the Council's attempts to influence the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran and that country's continuing
pursuit of economic and other concessions in exchange for actions related to its nuclear activities, see infra notes
273-76 and corresponding text.
200 Efforts by North Korea to obtain various economic and other concessions have been a major part of its often
aggressive negotiating positions with the international community with respect to its nuclear activities. See Nancy
E. Soderberg, Op-Ed, Escaping North Korea's Nuclear Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at A37 ("The history of
negotiation with North Korea is one in which the international community has repeatedly offered incentives to
North Korea to rein in its nuclear programs."). North Korea's vice foreign minister stated the issue bluntly: "Our
demand is also for the U.S. to make due compensation for the freeze and dismantlement of nuclear facilities that
we have built with huge investment, tightening our belts." Colum Lynch, North Korea Resists Talks on NuclearArms;
Meeting by US. Election Is Unlikely, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2004, at A21.
201 See supra notes 67-68 and corresponding text.
202 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Arts. IV(2), X(2), July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729
UNTS 161 [hereinafter NPT]; see infra notes 262-63 and corresponding text.
203 David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament and Devel-
opment Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 993, 1034-35 (1991). For example, non-nuclear states such as Iran may
argue that part of their "compensation" under the NPT for agreeing not to exercise their right to develop nuclear
weapons is an inalienable right to acquire all forms of "peaceful" nuclear technology. See Henry Sokolski, Taking
Proliferation Seriously, POL'Y REV., Oct. 1, 2003, at 18.
204 See Tucker, supra note 149, at 33-34 (noting that it is highly unlikely that biological weapons could ever pro-
vide the same level of deterrence as nuclear weapons since nuclear retaliation is immediate, devastating, and effective
against military equipment as well as troops, while biological weapons are "slow, uncertain in their effects, and inca-
pable of destroying military hardware and buildings").
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which comports with the view of scholars who argue that states like North Korea are probably
more motivated to join a regime by profit than by security interests. 20 5 While a self-interested
North Korean regime might possibly be encouraged to participate in a reformed BWC regime,
history has demonstrated that such a regime would require legally binding, precise hard law
terms with access to verification measures as insurance that the international community will
"receive" from North Korea what it "pays" for.20 6
The advantages ofdeterminacy in enhanced enforcement. Even a strong international regime sup-
ported by a spectrum of self-interested member state preferences may at some point benefit from
the availability of sanctions for noncompliance, especially if incentives for offensive defection grow
as cooperation deepens.20 7 In this regard, determinacy may contribute to improving the BWC's
limited enforcement mechanisms. Although reputational sanctions are clearly more effective when
a regime imposes determinate, hard law obligations and has access to monitoring mechanisms so
that violations are known to other state actors,2 ° 8 reputational costs are less likely to affect states that
are already viewed as cheaters or rogues.20 9 If, however, rational states are making a choice either to
honor or to violate their international commitments, the availability of other, more effective sanc-
tions could improve compliance by making the possible costs of a breach outweigh the costs ofcom-
pliance, thus altering a state's payoffs.210
Few sanctions or enforcement options are available under the existing BWC framework.
Beyond notoriously ineffective voluntary consultation procedures and domestic criminal pen-
alties, 2 11 the Convention contemplates the possibility of sanctions by enabling states parties to
lodge a complaint with the Security Council in case of a breach of obligations under the Con-
vention by another state party.2 12 Without determinate provisions to identify violations when
205 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats, A Neoclassical Realist Theory of UnderbalancingInternationalSecu-
rity, 29 INT'L SECURITY 159, 165 (2004); seealso Randall L. Schweller, Bandwagoningfor Profit: Bringing the Revi-
sionist State Back In, 19 INT'L SECURITY 72, 87- 89 (1994).
206 The nonbinding "Agreed Framework," under which North Korea promised in 1994 that it would verifiably
freeze certain nuclear-processing activities in exchange for Western assistance, collapsed in 2002 after North Korea
refused to deny claims that it was secretly enriching weapons-grade uranium. Key ambiguous terms, especially those
related to the timing and sequence of activities and assistance, had been disputed by both sides for many years and
undermined effective cooperation. See Korean Reactions, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at 14 ("[T]he Agreed Frame-
work clearly contains many flaws and ambiguities that have stalled its implementation."). Beyond initial energy aid,
receipt by North Korea of additional assistance under the agreement reached on February 13, 2007, appears to
depend on meeting more determinate requirements than those found in the 1994 Agreed Framework. See Faces
SavedAllAround-TheNorth Korean NuclearDeal, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17,2007, at 28,30 (quoting the chiefAmer-
ican negotiator as having repeatedly told the North Koreans "that America needed to know 'precisely' what was
happening with uranium enrichment").
207 George Downs etal., Is the GoodNewsAbout Compliance GoodNewsAbout Cooperation? 50 INT'L ORG. 379,
397 (1996) (noting that " [c]ooperation in arms, trade, and environmental regulation may begin with agreements
that require little enforcement, but continued progress seems likely to depend on coping with an environment where
defection presents significant benefits").
208 See Guzman, supra note 14, at 1860.
209 Reputational models have been criticized as overused or incomplete and the reputational costs associated with
violation of international law in particular have been described as exaggerated or too heavily relied upon by scholars.
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 90, at 102.
210 Guzman, supra note 14, at 1860.
21 1 The BWC relies on each state party to enact implementing legislation with appropriate criminal penalties
under Article IV and to participate on a voluntary basis in additional consultation and confidence-building mea-
sures; most states have declined to participate in these voluntary measures. See supra note 76.
212 BWC, supra note 1, Art. VI(l). No state has ever availed itself of this right.
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they occur and without the benefit of any agreed multilateral monitoring mechanisms to con-
firm noncompliance, a state is unlikely to be able to submit a complaint that includes "all pos-
sible evidence confirming its validity." '2 13 Although the BWC requires no action on such com-
plaints other than carrying out an investigation and informing states of the results,2" 4 the
Security Council has identified the proliferation of biological weapons and other WMDs as a
"threat to international peace and security"2 15 and would thus be able to impose a variety of
enforcement measures on that basis if violations could be determined-and if no permanent
member vetoed those measures.
To the extent that legally binding agreements with more precise obligations are credited by
some scholars with an increased capacity for enforcement by bodies that are delegated that
responsibility, 216 determinacy in the BWC could make the possibility of Security Council
action a more effective sanction, particularly if combined with transparency measures. The
quasi-judicial or legalistically formal language in the BWC requiring the demonstration of a
"breach of obligations" reinforces the need for determinate provisions that allow both allega-
tions and potential defenses to be tested by agreed legal rules or requirements. 2 17 As currently
constituted, however, the indeterminate BWC framework makes the threat of sanctions almost
nonexistent, projecting little deterrence to offensive defectors; this threat is further diminished
by the BWC's lack of mandatory transparency measures.
Determinacy and drawing lines. Some legal scholars have suggested that international law
itself is intrinsically indeterminate, essentially constituting a rhetorical fabric used by powerful
actors to engage in international politics as they see fit.2 18 Although some degree of indeterminacy
appears to be inevitable in any set of rules and too much precision may even undermine a rule's effec-
tiveness, some outer boundary of a rule's elasticity must be established for it successfully to convey
a message regarding required or prohibited conduct,219 especially as regards arms control. A certain
degree of indeterminacy is inherent in any arms control or disarmament regime, but a high degree
of indeterminacy is likely to undermine the regime's objectives, particularly if it is impossible to
draw any bright lines between prohibited and permitted conduct. The limited experience of the
Treaty on Outer Space, a multilateral agreement that attempts to control arms and military activities
by relying on the term "peaceful purposes" while providing no clarifying rules or criteria, suggests
that such an indeterminate approach in this area is highly problematic.
220
213 Id. Each state party to the BWC undertakes in Article VI, paragraph 2, "to cooperate in carrying out any inves-
tigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council."
214 Id.
215 SC Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
216 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 427.
217 Id. (noting that legal review in the context of agreed rules and procedures is also more likely to increase the
reputational costs associated with violations).
218 See, e.g., David Kennedy, A New Stream ofInternational Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 (1988). Kennedy
further argues that international law has become obsessively process oriented and inappropriately state centered when in
fact the state might be better viewed as a "linguistic relationship between law and politics." Id. at 2, 49; see also DAVID
KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2004).
219 See FRANCK, supra note 101, at 53, 56-57.
220 See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 513-22 (1997). Cheng describes definitional
problems related to the phrase "for peaceful purposes only" in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty as giving rise
to "grave anxiety." Id. at 513. The United States has chosen to interpret "peaceful purposes" in this Treaty as mean-
ing "non-aggressive" (rather than "non-military"), an expansive view that leaves the door open to controversies over
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Although achieving a higher degree of rule determinacy in the BW context is not a simple
task because of the difficulty of distinguishing between some offensive and defensive or "peace-
ful" BW activities, broad differences between related BW programs can be identified and key
elements that are common to offensive programs can be subjected to restrictions or special scru-
tiny through appropriate transparency measures. 22 ' Four areas for which such criteria and rules
could be established are large-scale dissemination trials of BW agents, large-scale BW produc-
tion activities, work on BW delivery systems, and efforts to enhance the potency of patho-
gens.2 22 Inside these four areas, "bright lines" could be drawn setting forth specific restrictions
and transparency measures for certain activities or items, including the size or volume of certain
types of equipment necessary to produce pathogens (such as fermenters and centrifugal sep-
arators), the quantity of certain types of manufacturing materials (such as the media needed to
grow pathogens), and the research equipment and facilities necessary for developing BW deliv-
ery systems (such as aerosol inhalation chambers, spraying and fogging systems, and aerosol-
generating units).223
While not without challenges, lines could be drawn between key prohibited BW activities
and permitted peaceful biotechnological activities, allowing mechanisms to be established to
monitor compliance by using determinate rules and requirements that incorporate these dis-
tinctions. Critics of such an approach argue that even measures that incorporate clearer rules
and requirements will not be effective in verifying compliance or in deterring violations by the
most determined cheaters. Foremost among these critics are U.S. government officials who
opposed the monitoring provisions in the BWC draft protocol on those grounds.224 Incon-
gruously, some of these same officials had previously expressed support for such measures to
the defensive nature ofweapons and military activities, and one that Cheng describes as "needless, wrong, and poten-
tially noxious." Id. at 520. Article IV does, however, provide the following clarifying language: "The establishment
of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military
manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden." Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, 610 UNTS 205. The limiting term
"peaceful purposes" in the Antarctic Treaty similarly has the potential to raise definitional concerns, although Arti-
cle I of that Treaty prohibits "any measures of a military nature" and further provides that specific prohibitions set
forth in that agreement are, as Cheng explains, "exemplificative and not exhaustive." Antarctic Treaty, Art. I, Dec.
1, 1959, 12 UST 794, 402 UNTS 71; CHENG, supra, at 517.
In spite of attempts to establish parameters for the term "peaceful purposes," both the Antarctic and Outer Space
Treaties also contain potentially problematic exemptions for these clarifying elaborations in subsequent provisions.
See Antarctic Treaty, supra, Art. 1(2) (providing: "The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel
or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose."); Outer Space Treaty, supra, Art. IV (pro-
viding: "The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be pro-
hibited.").
221 See Graham S. Pearson, Biological Weapons: Their Nature and Arms Control, in NON-CONVENTIONAL-
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, supra note 122, at 99, 117 (noting that "the depth of understanding and the scale of
work has to be much greater to support an offensive programme"). Subjecting key elements of offensive BW pro-
grams to restrictions or special scrutiny does not require, and should not be used to promote, the establishment of
lists or definitions of types or quantities ofpermitted biological agents or toxins, since such an action could be used
to undermine the scope of the BWC's general prohibitions.
222 See D. L. Huxsoll et al., Medicine in DefenseAgainst Biological Warfare, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 677 (1989),
citedin Pearson, supra note 221, at 294. An initial attempt to establish rules based in part on these key elements was
made, unsuccessfully, in the BWC draft protocol.
223 These and other useful potential restrictions are suggested by the Australia Group's existing control lists and
could serve to clarify not only what is prohibited under the BWC but also what is appropriate for exchange and
transfer. See infra notes 251-56 and corresponding text.
224 See Bolton, supra note 83; Mahley, supra note 80 (stressing that the "draft Protocol will not improve our ability
to verify BWC compliance").
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Congress, stating that effective verification was never the goal of the BWC draft protocol, but
rather "greater transparency" in "dual-capable activities and facilities," and that there was "real
value" in increased transparency measures that could "complicate the efforts of countries to
cheat on their BWC obligations. "225
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, some commentators and U.S. government officials
pointed to the failure of UN inspections in Iraq as evidence of the futility of monitoring
efforts in deterring the development of BW and other WMD programs by a rogue state.
There is now some irony in these arguments in light of the U.S. government's 6wn findings
(subsequent to the invasion) indicating that these and other UN activities did in fact con-
tribute to impeding or complicating the development of Iraqi BW programs. 226 Further-
more, while some nascent BW research activities may be difficult to detect even with deter-
minate rules and transparency measures, that is not true of the later stages of BW research
and production and the integration of these weapons into military strategy and training.
227
On balance, while no design elements can ensure that resolute cheaters will not violate the
BWC regime, determinacy and transparency together can significantly contribute to pro-
moting the regime's objectives, improving its effectiveness, and making cheating more dif-
ficult and more detectable.
V. INDETERMINATE ARMS CONTROL REGIMES AND COMPLIANT AND
CONFORMIST STATES
Perceived Discriminatory Effect on Developing Countries
To advance the complete elimination of a class or type of weapon, multinational disarma-
ment regimes strive to achieve universal membership and attract nonstates parties that are act-
ing in conformity with the regime's obligations. Persuading these "conformist states" to join
a regime formally and become compliant states parties may be impeded by the effect of inde-
terminacy on the attractiveness of membership. On one level, the real, alleged, and feared
defections that characterize the failure of a legally binding multinational disarmament regime
dependent on soft indeterminate terms and soft structure, that is, one lacking transparency
mechanisms, may make that regime less attractive generally. On another level, many develop-
ing states that have no interest in the weapons banned by a particular regime may also have little
225 Donald A. Mahley, Testimony, Biological Weapons Convention, in HearingBefore the Subcomm. on National
Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the House Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong.
(2000), available in LEXIS, Transcripts Library, Fed. Doc. Clearing House File, available at <http://www.fas.org/
spp/starwars/congress/2000_h/testimony__oCambassador donalda.htm>. But see Barbara Hatch Rosenberg &
Gordon Burck, Verification of Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL
ARMS RACE, supra note 49, at 300, 305 (noting that while no BWC verification regime will detect all violations,
"[a]dequate verification will deter violation of the Convention, make illegal actions difficult and limit their scale,
and provide workable means for international investigation of concerns that may be raised through national intel-
ligence").
226 See, e.g., 3 CIA COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 124, at 39 (noting that as early as 1992, UN sanctions,
inspections, mandatory declarations, and monitoring of the importation and use of media needed for the growth
of bacterial BW agents created "impediments for any Iraqi biological production effort").
227 Rosenberg & Burck, supra note 225, at 304 (arguing in addition that the difficulties in monitoring BW activ-
ities at the research level have been overstated).
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interest in becoming bound by its obligations. 228 These states may also believe that such a
regime could have a negative effect on their access to dual-use technologies and other materials.
Just as powerful egoist states are unlikely to join a regime that does not advance their security
interests, so other states are unlikely to join unless the regime provides incentives for consci-
entious potential members to participate and fully comply with its obligations.22'
While some suggest that not much is learned from empirical evidence of compliant behavior
by states like Benin and Burkina Faso under a regime like the Outer Space Treaty, the unwill-
ingness of many developing states to become parties to certain multilateral disarmament
regimes may tell us something about the impact of indeterminate and interdependent provi-
sions on the attractiveness of those regimes to such states. Powerful states may encourage less
developed states to join disarmament regimes by promising them the widest possible access to
dual-use technology and materials for peaceful purposes, in exchange for their abiding by
related restrictions on weapons-related uses. Yet powerful nations may also treat the indeter-
minate terms of a disarmament regime as flexible and expansive so that they can pursue ques-
tionable bioweapons research while treating those terms as hard, narrow, and restrictive when
it comes to attempts by developing states to gain access to restricted dual-use technologies.
By thus having it "both ways," powerful states may make a regime vulnerable to complaints
by developing states that it discriminates against them by imposing obligations that are not
coterminous with their disarmament responsibilities. Such perceived discriminatory conduct,
in turn, may undermine the developing world's support for a regime and impede efforts to
achieve universal membership by discouraging conformist nonsignatory states and compliant
signatory states from taking the actions necessary to join or become full states parties.
Compliant and Conformist States and the B WC
Currently, 155 of the 192 member states of the United Nations are parties to the BWC.23 °
Relatively few of them have ever been alleged to be states of BWC concern and thus almost all
of them can generally be described as compliant parties. 23' An additional 16 states have signed the
BWC but have not yet ratified it or otherwise taken the necessary steps to become parties.232 Most
of these states are also widely regarded as complying with their BWC obligations: only Egypt and
221 Compliant signatorystates in the developing world that have not yet completed the formal processes necessary
to become parties to disarmament regimes, like conformist nonsignatory states, may find full membership in such
regimes unattractive.
229 KEOHANE, supra note 156, at 103 ("Insofar as regimes create incentives for compliance, they also make it
more attractive for conscientious potential members to join them.").
230 See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, at <http://disarmament2.un.org/
TreatyStatus.nsf>. A state that is not a member of the United Nations, the Holy See, is a party to the BWC. Id.
231 Even U.S. officials quick to allege violations by other states have conceded that "the vast majority of the
BWC's parties have conscientiously met their commitments." John R. Bolton, Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional
Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation (May 6, 2002), available at
<http:/lwww.state.gov/t/us/rm19962.htm>.
232 The 16 states that have signed the BWC but not yet become parties are Burundi, the Central African Republic, C6te
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, and
the UAE. See Status ofMultilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, supra note 230. As signatories, these
states are obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the BWC pending their ratification,
acceptance, or approval of the Convention or until it "shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty." See Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, Art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1115 UNTS 331. There are currently
108 states parties, including Egypt, Syria, and 5 other BWC signatory states.
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Syria have been alleged to be of BW concern.2 33 Of the 21 nonsignatory states, only Israel
has been alleged to be of BW concern. 234 The remaining 20 states are generally regarded as
conformist nonsignatories, states that do not have BW programs and do not appear to be pur-
suing them.
235
Almost all of the 20 apparently compliant nonsignatory states are poor, fragile, or economically
distressed, and most are classified among the least-developed or poorest countries of the world.236
Most of the 14 apparently compliant BWC signatory states also fall into that category. 7 Both of
these groups of states may have more incentives to adopt preferences related to economic and tech-
nical development than to the acquisition ofa new, uncertain, and expensive unconventional weap-
ons capability. 238 While unlikely to be interested in BW programs, these states are also no longer
moved by any of the incentives to join the BWC based on affiliation with one of the two camps
of Cold War adversaries. Uninterested in biological weapons but unmotivated to become a party
to the BWC, these poor or fragile states nonetheless prevent the BWC regime from achieving
universality.
In recent years, few states have ratified or acceded to the BWC.2 39 Beyond the considerations
listed above, two other factors that are linked to the failure of indeterminate regimes in acute
security dilemmas are likely to contribute to this apparent lack of motivation. First, the BWC
regime can be described as unattractive to possible new members because of its widely perceived
failure to address noncompliance issues and the continuing failure of the states parties to make
necessary reforms. Second, developing states may find the BWC regime unattractive because
they perceive the regime's indeterminate and interdependent provisions as having a discrimi-
natory impact on their access to health care and biotechnology resources. Most of the devel-
oping states that remain outside the BWC not only have limited financial resources but also
would probably prefer to obtain access to vaccines, diagnostic equipment, advanced biotech-
nology, and various pharmaceutical products than to join a treaty regime that does not
improve-and may be viewed as impeding--their access to health sciences and biotechnology.
233 See supra note 85.
234 The 21 members of the United Nations that have not signed the BWC are Andorra, Angola, Cameroon,
Chad, the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Zambia. See Weapons of
Mass Destruction, at <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/>.
235 See supra note 85. One nonsignatory, Kazakhstan, is not generally regarded as a state of BW concern but is
one of several states that inherited a significant amount of BW infrastructure from the former Soviet Union. See
generally SMITHSON, supra note 69.
236 Twelve of the 21 BWC nonsignatory states are listed by the United Nations as "least developed countries."
See UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, List of Least Developed Countries,
at <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm> [hereinafter LDC List]. An additional 5 are listed in the
World Bank's lowest two of five categories of economic development. SeeWorld Bank, Data and Statistics (2007),
at <http://www.worldbank.org/countries> [hereinafter World Bank Data].
237 Ten of the 16 BWC signatory states are listed by the United Nations as least-developed countries. See LDC
List, supra note 236. An additional 4 are listed in the World Bank's lowest two of five categories of economic devel-
opment. See World Bank Data, supra note 236.
238 Contrary to a view popularized in Western countries, the advanced science and technology required for BW
programs make biological weapons an unlikely component in the arsenals of developing countries. SeeWright, supra
note 55, at 6 (finding "some irony" in describing biological weapons as the "poor man's nuke" in view of their devel-
opment by industrialized countries).
239 Only 12 UN member states have become parties to the BWC since 2000. See Status of Multilateral Arms
Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, supra note 230. All of the 16 signatory states that have failed to com-
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As seen above, despite arguments that soft law facilitates wider participation in regimes and
more easily permits reluctant states to join and comply with regime requirements,24 ° soft inde-
terminate provisions in legally binding agreements like the BWC may have the opposite effect
for developing states. The ambiguities in Article I permit powerful industrial states to advance
their own security interests by undertaking questionable BW research activities for "prophy-
lactic, protective or other peaceful purposes," while broadly prohibiting the exchange of var-
ious dual-use materials through export controls coordinated by the Australia Group (AG).24
Although developing countries enjoy the right under Article X to "the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacterio-
logical (biological) agents and toxins, ' ' 42 in practice the developed industrial states have used
the indeterminate conditional phrase "for peaceful purposes" in that article to justify the impo-
sition of whatever AG-coordinated restrictions they deem appropriate on the transfer and
export of dual-use materials, technology, and information. AG member states argue that these
export controls merely implement Article III of the BWC by preventing the transfer of any of
the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery specified in Article 1.243 However,
no rules or criteria established collectively by BWC states parties inform this implementation
process.
Although Article X further requires that the BWC be "implemented in a manner designed
to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Con-
vention," this requirement again applies only to indeterminate "peaceful bacteriological (bio-
logical) activities. "244 For purposes of export control, the AG has turned interdependent and
vague terms in the BWC into precise national rules by imposing standardized end-user under-
takings through common lists of export-controlled biological agents and dual-use biotechnol-
ogy. Developing states argue that many of the prohibited items on these lists are necessary for
disease control and public health improvements and that AG export control measures are
applied in a discriminatory manner, contravening their rights under the BWC to the free
exchange of materials, technology, and expertise.
2 45
Advanced industrial states thus exploit the interdependent term "peaceful purposes" so that
it remains indeterminate and flexible when applied against them under Article I but specific
plete the necessary procedures to become a member of the BWC originally signed the Convention in 1972 or 1973
immediately after it was opened for signature. Id.
240 Shelton, supra note 13, at 319; pt. V, "Perceived Discriminatory Effect on Developing Countries," supra.
241 BWC, supra note 1, Art. I(1). The AG is an informal consultative arrangement of states that was founded in
1984 after events in the Iran-Iraq war revealed that some countries were producing chemical weapons with materials
obtained through international trade and a lack of uniform licensing measures. The AG first sought to impede the
proliferation of chemical weapons through coordinated national export control laws and later expanded its mandate
to include biological weapons. All thirty-eight states that participate in the AG are parties to the BWC and the
CWC and include most of the states of the world with advanced biological and biotechnology industries. See AG,
Origins of the Australia Group, at <http://www.australiagroup.net>.
242 BWC, supra note 1, Art. X(1).
243 See AG, Objectives of the Group, at <http://www.australiagroup.net>.
244 BWC, supra note 1, Art. X(2).
245 See, e.g., Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese Delegation, Statement to the Fifth Review Conference of the States
Parties to the BWC (Nov. 19, 2001), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7, at 3 (criticizing advanced countries
for "stubbornly sticking to existing discriminatory practices" that were "detrimental... to the legitimate rights of
states parties"); John Zarocostas, Gaps Remain in Weapons Ban Talks, UPI, Feb. 23, 2001, available in LEXIS, Wire
Service Stories Library.
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and hard when broadly applied through export controls against developing states under Arti-
cles III and X. Besides being widely perceived as discriminatory, this practice cannot advance
the achievement of universality. 246 It arguably also creates incoherence, which undermines the
legitimacy of the BWC regime itself.247 Current BWC states parties in the developing world
that participated in the Ad Hoc Group emphasized these concerns by showing less interest in
the draft protocol's verification measures than in its attempts to establish lines distinguishing
the types of equipment and materials that are-and are not-properly subject to transfer
restrictions under the Convention.24 8 Without more determinate language to draw such lines,
developing states parties attempting to import biotechnological and pharmaceutical materials
for peaceful purposes will continue to face restrictions that are not coterminous with the prob-
lem of biological weapons, creating a confrontational situation that over time will be hard to
contain under a multilateral disarmament agreement. 24'9 For developing nonparty states, the
rational mechanisms associated with the BWC's indeterminate and interdependent terms are
likely to perpetuate their perception of the BWC's discriminatory application, fueling their dis-
incentives to participate in the regime.
Hard Solutions for the B WC: Applying Determinacy to Compliant and Conformist States
The problems for compliant and conformist nonparty states that are caused by the discrim-
inatory application of indeterminate terms in the BWC cannot be solved by the Western
approach of using different definitions for the same language in key articles, since developing
and many other states clearly view these articles as inseparably linked.2 5 ° Instead, determinacy
in the BWC framework, in conjunction with greater transparency, has the potential to resolve
this problem by allowing developing states greater access to technology and materials that are
not subject to BWC regulation, while at the same time clarifying restrictions on prohibited
activities. Some determinate, line-drawing solutions to perceived BWC discrimination prob-
lems are suggested by the Australia Group's own codification efforts. From the perspective of
246 See, e.g., Rakesh Sood, head of Delegation of India, Statement to the Fifth Review Conference of the States
Parties to the BWC (Nov. 20, 2001), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7, at 5 ("The promotional aspects of
Article X are, we believe, a crucial element in strengthening the Convention and even perhaps in achieving universal
adherence.").
247 See FRANCK, supra note 101, at 153.
248 See Oliver Thrinert, Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, in ENHANCING THE BWC, supra note
145, at 17 (further noting that many African countries perceive greater threats from diseases like HIV and Ebola
than from BW programs); Zarocostas, supra note 245 (quoting Ambassador Tibor T6th, chairman of the Ad Hoc
Group, as saying that export controls "were debated in a heated manner," with emphasis by developing countries
on the need for access to technology related to diseases).
249 See Chayes & Shelton, supra note 30, at 525 ("Long-term stability and efficiency require that arms control
regimes be built upon mutual interests and relationships, not confrontation.").
250 See Celina M. Assumpgao de Valle Pereira, ambassador, Statement to the Fifth Review Conference of the
States Parties to the BWC (Nov. 19,2001), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7 (describing nonproliferation
and technological cooperation as viewed as the "two main pillars" of the BWC); Sood, supra note 246, para. 7
(describing Articles III and X as "two mutually inseparable aspects of any disarmament agreement that deals with
a dual-use technology"); Sha Zukang, supra note 245, at 3 (arguing that nonproliferation activities and the pro-
motion of peaceful uses of biotechnology "should be complementary and mutually reinforcing," while noting with
regret that "a minority of countries have gone out of their way to separate the two issues"); Abdul Basit, acting per-
manent representative of Pakistan, Statement to the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC
(Nov. 19, 2001), available at BWC Web site, supra note 7, para. 10 (emphasizing that Pakistan "cannot agree to
an interpretation of Article III that is in any manner at variance with the provisions of Article X").
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many developing and other states that seek fully to implement the free exchange of tech-
nology envisioned in the BWC, certain types of protective and containment equipment
listed as AG-controlled items have important applications for public health. 251' From the
perspective of powerful states that already benefit from advanced biotechnology and are
more interested in security, the export of such items to developing states would be less
problematic if it were covered by mandatory transparency measures such as some form of
monitoring requirements.
Unlike protective equipment, however, other types of AG-controlled items appear to be
more useful for BW programs than for disease control or peaceful medical activities, partic-
ularly when quantitative requirements and rules are applied. These items include fermenters
with specified high capacities, 252 centrifugal separators with specified capabilities including
high flow rates, 253 aerosol inhalation chambers with specified high capacities, 254 and other
items necessary for the development of BW delivery systems such as spraying and fogging sys-
tems and aerosol-generating units.2 55 Thus, many items on the AG-controlled list were log-
ically included on mandatory declaration lists in the final composite text of the BWC draft
protocol.2 56
While bringing determinacy and consistency to the BWC through more precise technolog-
ical specifications presents challenges, the common items of equipment that appear on both
the AG-controlled list and the mandatory declaration list of the draft protocol suggest that the
BWC states parties could collectively agree on at least some types of equipment that should be
subject to prohibitions or increased scrutiny under Article I and to denial of transfer or export
under Articles III and X. The establishment of monitoring mechanisms could give AG member
states corresponding incentives to abandon their conflicted approach to several items they find
acceptable for themselves yet not for transfer or export to other states. From the self-interested
perspective of these developed states, the continued use of only their own guidelines to prohibit
transfers (rather than a complementary and collective agreement by BWC states parties on crit-
ical ambiguous terms) continues to risk undermining the disarmament regime they seek to
reinforce.2 57 While powerful states can be expected to pursue their own interests, AG member
251 Protective and containment equipment includes complete containment facilities (at the "containment" or
"maximum containment," known as the P3 and P4, levels, as specified by the WHO) and various types of protective
suits and biological safety cabinets or isolators. AG, Control List of Dual Use Biological Equipment and Related




255 Id. §1.8. Other items of concern that seem unlikely to be used primarily for peaceful civilian activities have
been included on AG-controlled lists so as to raise the awareness of the industry, including equipment for the
microencapsulation of live microorganisms and toxins in the range of one to ten microns particle size; fermenters
that have small capacities but are part ofaggregate orders or are designed for use in combined systems would similarly
justify special treatment. Id., Items for Inclusion in Awareness Raising Guidelines, paras. 1-2.
256 For example, each state party with specified facilities would have been required under the protocol to declare
production of designated agents using bioreactors/fermenters with total internal volume of 50 liters or more, see
Protocol to the BWC, supra note 79, at 19-20, and would also have been required to supply information concerning
various other types of equipment present at or used in a declared facility, including specified types of continuous
or semicontinuous centrifuges with throughput capacity greater than 100 liters per hour, see id. at 118.
257 BWC developing states strongly criticize this extraregime regulatory approach, arguing that "the transfer
of dual-use materials for medical, diagnostic and treatment purposes should be regulated on the basis of guide-
lines to be negotiated and accepted by all States Parties." See Sood, supra note 246, para. 7. For its part, the
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states may be taking a myopic view of those interests by not seeking to clarify these key ambi-
guities, by maintaining BW export control lists outside the BWC regime, and, in the case of
the United States, by opposing a legally binding BWC monitoring regime that also attempts
to establish some determinate rules and requirements.
2 58
In view of the probable scant interest of most compliant and conformist nonparty states in
joining the BWC, the scarcity of their resources for engaging in major disarmament initiatives,
and their likely competing preferences, the question arises of the willingness of such states to
embrace a reformed BWC regime even with the inclusion of determinate provisions. The expe-
rience of other regimes may shed some insight on this question. Twenty-four of the thirty-one
poorest developing countries that are not parties to the BWC have nonetheless expended scarce
governmental resources and shown sufficient interest in limiting the spread of WMDs to
become parties to the CWC, and all thirty-one have become parties to the NPT.2 59 Like the
BWC, both are multilateral disarmament agreements that address access to complex dual-use
technology and materials capable of generating acute security dilemmas.
That all but seven of the thirty-one developing states that have not become parties to the
BWC over the last forty years have chosen to join the CWC regime since it was opened for
signature in 1997 may reflect various calculations and assessments, but calls particular atten-
tion to the more determinate rules of the CWC and its developed oversight and monitoring
mechanisms.26 ° While the regulation of materials and technology related to biological weap-
ons presents a number of challenges, the success of the more recently established CWC regime
at least suggests that the BWC's relative lack of determinacy-the absence of rules, schedules,
or criteria for distinguishing peaceful biotechnology from prohibited BW programs-is not
the inevitable result of these challenges.26 1
United States has argued that the guidelines in the draft protocol "could undermine U.S. regulations against
the export of sensitive technology used in bioweapons." Glenda Cooper, U.S. Rejects BiologicalArms Ban Pro-
tocol, WASH. POST, July 26, 2001, at Al. Some arms control experts, however, have questioned why the draft
protocol's clearer requirements for export controls would undermine AG efforts rather than support them. See
Brugger, supra note 86.
258 "Myopic" self-interest refers to a state's perception of the relative costs and benefits of alternative available
courses of action with respect to a particular issue when the assessment of that issue is made in isolation from others.
KEOHANE, supra note 156, at 99. The apparent anomaly of egoistic states acting in ways that appear to be incon-
sistent with their interests may often be explained by the fact that they are complying with rules that conflict with
their immediate or "myopic" self-interests. Id.
259 See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, supra note 232. Only one state,
Angola, has signed neither the CWC nor the BWC; two other BWC nonparties, the Comoros and Israel, have
signed but not yet ratified the CWC. Id. As noted above, thirty-one of the thirty-seven UN member states that are
not parties to the BWC are designated as least-developed countries by the United Nations or are in the World Bank's
bottom two categories of economic development. See LDC List, supra note 236; World Bank Data, supra note 236.
Yet only seven of these poorest developing states (Angola, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Egypt, Myan-
mar, Somalia, and Syria) are not parties to the CWC. See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament
Agreements, supra note 232.
260 See infra text at notes 280-85.
261 Mikhail Berdennikov, special advisor to the director-general, The Experience of the Organization for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGALLY BINDING MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN
THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION 103, 107 (Marie Isabelle Chevrier et al. eds., 2004)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGALLY BINDING MEASURES]; Graham S. Pearson, The Key Elements of a
Legally Binding Instrument to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in id. at 55, 77 ("A compar-
ison of the BWTC legally binding instrument regime and the CWC regime has shown that the two regimes are
indeed comparable and effective.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
A brief review of other multilateral disarmament regimes that must address the instability
generated by easily confused military and civilian applications of regulated technology indi-
cates that such regimes rely increasingly as they mature on harder language-namely, more
determinacy-and harder structures-namely, legally binding verification and transparency
measures-to ensure the clarity of fundamental obligations under the regime. The regulation
of nuclear weapons under the NPT offers a case in point. The NPT is a legally binding agree-
ment that, among other things, obligates non-nuclear weapons parties not to acquire such
weapons and requires international inspections of all their nuclear activities to verify compli-
ance and ensure the peaceful use of any nuclear materials.26 2 Just as the BWC guarantees var-
ious rights with respect to peaceful uses of regulated dual-use materials, so the NPT affirms an
"inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" and guarantees the "fullest possible exchange of equip-
ment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy."2 63 As under the BWC, some NPT-regulated materials may have both military and
peaceful applications, increasing the risk of defensive defections based on misperceived threats.
The high security stakes at issue in the NPT and the "prestige" and power associated with
nuclear weapons also present temptations for offensive defectors, and this temptation is not
reduced by the status that several powerful countries continue to enjoy as nuclear weapons
states under the NPT.2" Structures and measures to identify and detect cheating are thus
design elements for an effective NPT regime.
Specific procedures and detailed requirements designed to ensure verification of the fulfill-
ment of a state's obligations under the NPT are incorporated into the legally binding compre-
hensive safeguards agreement that each non-nuclear weapons party is required to negotiate
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).265 As the NPT has matured, the IAEA
has "hardened" the regime's transparency requirements by continually extracting deeper and
more precise commitments from member states through legally binding additional protocols
that are designed to reinforce the safeguards agreements.26 6 The IAEA developed the Model
Additional Protocol in 1997 in response to Iraq's successful concealment of its pre-1991
nuclear program.
2 67
262 NPT, supra note 202, Arts. II, III.
263 Id., Art. IV(1), (2).
264 Unlike biological weapons, nuclear weapons are widely viewed as an effective strategic deterrent and have
become an integral part of the security policies ofNPT nuclear weapons states parties. Moreover, biological weapons
are less likely to inspire the "ferocious nationalistic pride" that nuclear weapons and energy generate in some states.
See Christopher Dickey et al., Iran's Rogue Rage, Nukes: Iranians Want Nuclear Know-How---and Seem to Be Daring
the West to Stop Them, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 2006, at 26, 26.
265 The IAEA is a UN-related organization whose safeguards system is intended to verify NPT compliance. As
of March 22, 2007, thirty-one NPT non-nuclear weapon states had not yet brought into force a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: Overview of Status (Mar. 22,
2007), at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/nptstatus-overview.html>.
266 One hundred and eleven UN member states have signed additional protocols and seventy-seven are currently
in force; a protocol with Iran is being implemented pending its formal entry into force, although Iran recently cur-
tailed most access to its facilities. See id.
267 See IAEA Staff Reports, More States Sign Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Nov. 28, 2005),
available at <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2005/safeguardsrights.html>.
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In the case of Iran's controversial uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and
related deceptive practices, the IAEA has sought more detailed and precise information and
an even more comprehensive level of access than is required by the safeguards agreement and
additional protocol.2 68 Such additional detailed transparency and verification measures form
a critical part of the maturing and hardening of the NPT regime as it has continued to attract
new members: only 4 of the 192 members of the United Nations are nonparties to the NPT
and remain outside its legally binding obligations.26 9
Even as the NPT has progressively become harder, the regime has suffered setbacks in some
important cases where the IAEA has relied on both nonlegally binding instruments and inde-
terminate language. For example, after years of failing to meet its obligations under its safe-
guards agreement,27 ° the Iranian government was nonetheless initially able to escape referral
by the IAEA to the UN Security Council for its apparent NPT violations in September 2003
by agreeing merely to a vague nonbinding statement that it would voluntarily suspend its sus-
pect uranium enrichment and processing activities.27 ' On January 10, 2006, Iran reneged on
this nonbinding commitment and announced that it had broken the internationally moni-
tored seals at its nuclear sites and would resume "research activities" with equipment that
included centrifuges capable of enriching uranium for use in a nuclear bomb.27 2 On June 6,
2006, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany offered Iran a
package of incentives accompanied by an array of possible penalties aimed at persuading
it to freeze some of its most important questionable nuclear activities.2 73 After Iran rejected
a proposed incentives package and refused to halt its enrichment and reprocessing activ-
ities, the UN Security Council, on July 31, 2006, adopted a resolution calling on Iran to
268 The IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran to adopt these additional transparency measures on September 24,
2005, noting that "Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue." IAEA Res. GOV2005/77, pmbl., para.
4 (Sept. 24, 2005), at <http:llwww.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>. Subse-
quent board resolutions have continued to stress the need for Iran to implement all required transparency measures
and support ongoing board investigations. See, e.g., IAEA Res. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006), at <http://www.
iaea.org/Publications/DocumentslBoard/2006/gov2OO6-14.pdf>. The UN Security Council has repeatedly
affirmed that Iran must comply with IAEA Res. GOV/2006/14 in order "to build confidence in the exclusively
peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions." SC Res. 1696, para. 1 (July 31,
2006); SC Res. 1737, para. 1 (Dec. 27, 2006); SC Res. 1747, para. 1 (Mar. 24, 2007).
269 India, Israel, and Pakistan have not signed the NPT; North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but in January
2003 announced its intention to withdraw. See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agree-
ments, supra note 230.
270 IAEA Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67 (Sept. 2, 2005), at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/
gov2005-67.pdf> (detailing how over many years Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards
agreement by not reporting nuclear material, its processing, and its use; not declaring related processing and storage
facilities; not providing design information; and engaging in "extensive concealment activities").
271 Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers, para. 2(b)(i) (Oct. 21, 2003),
available at <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Iaealran/statement iran21102003.shtml>. Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator noted that Iran had "won a crucial change to reflect the fact that the freeze of its enrichment
program was 'not legally binding."' Elaine Sciolino, Iran Backs away from a Demand on A-Bomb Fuel, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2004, at Al.
272 Steven R. Weisman & Nazila Fathi, Iranians Reopen Nuclear Centers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al.
273 Nazila Fathi & Elaine Sciolino, Iran Open to Incentives on Nuclear Talks, with a Hedge, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2006, at A14. Subsequent attempts by the European Union to work out an "incentives package" with Iran led to
Iranian requests for specific details on "verification" and "sequencing." SeeJudy Dempsey, Iranian andEuropeEnvoy
Open Talks on Uranium Enrichment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A14.
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suspend these activities.274 Confronted with Iranian defiance, the Security Council approved addi-
tional resolutions in December 2006 and March 2007, which imposed mild sanctions and threat-
ened tougher ones if Iran continued to fail to comply with the Council's demands.275
As the Iranian nuclear crisis continues to unfold at the writing of this article, concerned NPT
members face considerable risks and challenges in designing a supplemental framework to ensure
that Iran will comply fully with regime requirements as it continues to engage in "peaceful" nuclear
activities. Since Iran enjoys an "inalienable right" to the peacefil use of nuclear energy-which its
leaders argue includes uranium enrichment processes that can produce both fuel for nuclear reactors
and fissionable material for nuclear weapons- continuing efforts to persuade Iran to forgo that
right are likely to involve proposed incentives, rewards, or compensation, in addition to the threat
of possible sanctions.
The design of an incentives or compensation package to encourage Iran to comply with its NPT
obligations and permit related inspections will probably require determinacy to establish the req-
uisite behavior, the contours of the incentives, and the penalties involved. Both sides in such a trans-
action appear to have a fundamental interest in ensuring determinacy, as demonstrated by the initial
response of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator to the package of incentives and penalties proposed on
June 6, 2006, when he expressed concern about the removal of some "ambiguities."
27 6
Another example of applied determinacy and transparency in a multilateral disarmament
regime charged with the regulation of dual-use materials is the CWC. The CWC enjoys the
benefit of a dedicated full-time oversight authority, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW),27 7 as well as an elaborate verification regime containing mech-
anisms and procedures for conducting eleven different types of inspections that can take ad-
vantage of several reinforcing layers of determinate rules. In addition to obligations in the text,
annexes to the CWC spell out, with as much clarity and precision as possible, critical defini-
tions, guidelines, criteria, and schedules of chemicals to be used in regulating the elimination
of chemical weapons. 278 The CWC also contains an Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information and an Annex on Implementation and Verification, which establish various cri-
teria and definitions pertaining to regulated equipment, buildings, and personnel.27 9
As with other regulated weapons, various incentives for defection by states from CW
disarmament cooperation can easily be identified. For example, the military and civilian
applications of many chemicals and their precursors may elicit misperceived threats and
274 SC Res. 1696 (July 31, 2006). Iran failed to comply with the Council's sixty-day deadline for suspension of
these activities. See Dafna Linzer & Colum Lynch, Iran Continues Nuclear Work Despite Deadline, Sanction Threat,
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2007, at A14.
275 See SC Res. 1737 (Dec. 27, 2006) (prohibiting trade with Iran in nuclear materials and ballistic missiles and
freezing financial assets often key Iranian entities and twelve individuals associated with these programs); SC Res.
1747 (Mar. 24, 2007) (banning all Iranian arms exports and freezing financial assets of fifteen Iranian individuals
and thirteen entities linked to Iranian military and nuclear agencies).
276 Fathi & Sciolino, supra note 273.
277 The OPCW includes the Conference of States Parties, Executive Council, Technical Secretariat, Confiden-
tiality Commission, and advisory boards on science and administrative and financial matters.
278 An integral part of the CWC is a detailed Annex on Chemicals that includes Guidelines for Schedules of
Chemicals. The guidelines in part I of the annex contain specific criteria for determining whether toxic chemicals
or precursors should be included in one of three different schedules or levels of regulation in part II of the annex.
These schedules identify chemicals for the application of extensive verification measures according to the provisions
of the detailed Verification Annex. See CWC, supra note 158, Annex on Chemicals.
279 See CWC, Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information; id., Annex on Implementation and
Verification.
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defensive defections. In addition, unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons have a his-
tory of demonstrated military utility, particularly in some recent conflicts in the Middle
East, and thus present a real risk that a state will cheat to gain a decisive military advantage.
Unlike the BWC regime, the CWC regime has been forced to deal with weapons that in
many cases were deployed in sizable numbers and often presented complex questions
about their safe removal and disposal.28 ° In spite of the CWC's recent entry into force, the
incentives for noncompliance, and the complexity and expense of safe and environmen-
tally sound CW disposal, the regime has achieved striking success. The CWC has already
attracted 179 UN members as states parties, and in the ten years since its entry into force
in 1997 all CW production facilities declared by states have been inactivated, all declared
CW stockpiles have been inventoried and verified, and 59 of the 65 declared CW produc-
tion facilities have been either destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes.2 8 ' In addi-
tion, nearly twenty-eight hundred inspections have taken place at nearly two hundred
CW-related facilities and at over 850 industrial sites on the territory of 77 states parties.2 82
As the CWC regime matures and cooperation deepens, determinacy plays an increasingly
important role in the success of inspections, the regulation of chemical agents, the elim-
ination of CW stockpiles, and related assistance activities.
Although states have succeeded in making other multilateral disarmament regimes progres-
sively harder, the collapse and failure of collective state action to reform the BWC has coincided
with calls by some legal scholars to focus less attention on governmental actions and more on
the role that individual scientists, businesses, trade organizations, academic groups, and other
nongovernmental actors in civil society can play in preventing BW proliferation and in pro-
tecting human health and the environment. 283 Consistently with the view that rejects states
as primary and unitary actors in international affairs in favor of a disaggregated model that
emphasizes the role of nonstate actors and the importance of transnational societal interac-
tion,284 some commentators have suggested that the appearance of new and reemerging infec-
tious diseases has demonstrated the limitations of Westphalian governance,2 85 while high-
lighting the growing significance of nonstate actors in a new framework of "global health
280 David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things?: DismantlingExcess Weapons WhileProtectingtheEnvi-
ronment, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 451 (1995).
281 See Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, supra note 230; Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Declarations and Inspections, and Chemical Weapons Destruction Under
Way (Mar. 16, 2007), at <http://www.opcw.org/factsandfigures/index.html> (further noting that "[o]ver 30%
of the 8.6 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the Convention have been verifiably destroyed").
282 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Declarations and Inspections, supra note 281.
283 See Wright & Falk, supra note 125, at 433 (arguing for "a heightened mobilization of global civil society" as
with conclusion of the antipersonnel land mines treaty as only way to avoid a biological arms race); see also Kenneth
Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role ofInternationalNon-governmental Organizations,
and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR J. INT'L L. 91 (2000); Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights:
Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 INT'L ORG. 613 (1998).
284 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87
AJIL 205, 225 (1993); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,
51 INT'L ORG. 513, 522 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory ofInternationalLaw, 94 ASIL PROC. 240
(2000).
285 See generally David P. Fidler, SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post- Westphalian Pathogen, 31 J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 485 (2003).
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governance. ' ' 286 In fact, transnational societal efforts to prevent BW proliferation continue to
be pursued, including through codes of conduct for scientists, guidelines for corporations in
the biopharmaceutical sector, and various other initiatives designed to provide more safety and
security in biotechnology.
Notwithstanding their increasing importance in some areas, transnational societal efforts
have made uneven progress across different fields of international cooperation 287 and may be
especially limited in the area of national security, where states play the dominant role and con-
tinue to develop dangerous weaponized pathogens on the basis of their own security-driven,
self-interested preferences. Furthermore, many transnational societal efforts related to BW
nonproliferation are affected by the large amounts of funding that governments now provide
to universities, companies, and other nonstate actors for their participation in BW-related pro-
grams, including expansive and sometimes questionable biodefense programs. 28 8 Their many
financial and other interests may prevent these transnational societal efforts from being con-
sistently or universally directed toward the same goals. 289 One important group of nonstate
actors that supports many transnational biosecurity and biosafety issues, the U.S. pharmaceu-
tical industry, has also been a major force in opposing efforts to strengthen the BWC regime.
In comments reflecting the concerns of this group, the U.S. government stated that it opposed
the BWC draft protocol in part because it would negatively affect the pharmaceutical and bio-
tech industries by putting "confidential business information at risk."
29
1
In the long term, however, determinacy may offer solutions for some of the nonstate actors
that now oppose a harder BWC regime. For instance, while some concerns expressed by the
U.S. pharmaceutical and biotech industries regarding the draft protocol may be legitimate,
the experience of the U.S. chemical industry in implementing the CWC suggests that corpo-
rations can protect their business secrets and function reasonably well under a broadly similar
disarmament regime if clearly stated, determinate requirements underlie applicable monitor-
ing measures. While biological and chemical weapons present some different challenges, the
286 See David P. Fidler, Constitutional Outlines ofPublic Health s New WorldOrder, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 247,267
(2004) (noting how nonstate actors performed key monitoring functions and provided accurate data on the SARS
outbreak in China in 2003, eventually forcing China to deal more openly with the outbreak and causing similar
embarrassment for the governments of Thailand and Indonesia).
287 While transnational societal factors may contribute to the larger phenomenon of globalization or the cross-
national convergence of national economic and regulatory systems, state interests continue to play a critical role,
and this globalization is not proceeding evenly either across the globe or across economic sectors or other regulatory
topics. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajec-
tories of Rule Development, 91 AJIL 231, 232 (1997).
288 The U.S. government's financial involvement with academic institutions in this area began in 1942 with con-
tracts for secret work at over two dozen major U.S. universities. See Barton J. Bernstein, Origins of the Biological
Warfare Program, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE, supra note 49, at 9, 12. By 1968, U.S. government
involvement in both chemical and biological weapons programs had made such weapons "big business" for industry
and higher learning. CLARKE, supra note 31, at 8. Massive increases in U.S. biodefense spending in recent years
involve numerous government agencies and nonstate institutions. In the civilian biodefense sector alone, the gov-
ernment has dramatically increased spending since 2001. Joby Warrick, Custom-Built Pathogens Raise Bioterror
Fears, WASH. POST, July 31, 2006, at Al ("Five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the federal government budgets
nearly $8 billion annually-an 18-fold increase since 2001-for the defense of civilians against biological attack.").
289 Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AJIL 348, 348 (2006) (noting
that "[t] oday, overwhelming NGO support for the international rule of law can no longer be assumed. NGOs follow
their own stars.").
290 Mahley, supra note 80 ("In our assessment, the draft Protocol would put national security and confidential
business information at risk.").
[Vol. 101:271
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF INDETERMINACY IN ARMS CONTROL REGIMES
pharmaceutical industry might find determinacy in the BWC regime to be as desirable as the
chemical industry and member governments have found it to be in the CWC regime. 291 Non-
governmental organizations and nonstate or transnational actors that strongly support BW
nonproliferation efforts may also support hard rules since they can provide these actors with
a range of new strategies and facilitate enforcement actions against both governmental and
nongovernmental entities.29 2
While transnational actors will continue to contribute to BW nonproliferation efforts and
are likely to benefit from determinate rules in the BWC, state actors with security-driven pref-
erences hold the key to establishing an effective ban on biological weapons. In 1972, in an
attempt to achieve various short-term security objectives in the context of bipolar Cold War
strategies, the most powerful state actors chose the short-term benefits and expediency of
soft indeterminate provisions and soft structural approaches in designing a "hard" legally
binding BWC regime. In the context of modern BW proliferation problems, however,
these states now have a self-interested security basis for eschewing this type ofsoft law approach.
The United States in particular has reason to reevaluate, in light of its long-term national
security interests, the rejection of BWC reform policies that it embraced prior to adopting a
position based on myopic interests and unilateralist sentiments. Although a soft law approach
based on indeterminacy may be beneficial in other contexts, the long-term impact of its
psychological and rational mechanisms in modern arms control and multilateral security
instruments presents fundamental problems that pose a different research agenda.
291 See Tibor T6th, The Requirement to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF LEGALLY BINDING MEASURES, supra note 261, at 9, 13 (arguing that the industry players involved
in BWC-related activities "will need clear-cut rules of the game" and that "these companies and industrial actors
would prefer clarity in the rules of the game that are applicable globally").
292 SeeAbbott & Snidal, supra note 17, at 451 (private demandeurs will normally press for hard law, other things
being equal, to raise the costs of violation for other parties and to facilitate enforcement against resister groups and
governments, including their own).
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